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Algorithmic Decisions Systems (ADS) are now commonly integrated within governing 
institutions ranging from the criminal justice system to social welfare programs. In an 
apolitical world, we might expect these considerations to be purely decided on 
bureaucratic optimization, but within highly politicized and contentious policy areas, we 
can expect each of these decisions to be opportunities for strategic interactions between 
interested parties. My dissertation seeks to address three core questions regarding 
governmental adoption of Algorithmic Decision Systems. 1) What attributes of these 
systems may lead legislators to support their use? 2) Does the inclusion of ADSs increase 
legislative support for bills that include these systems? 3) Do changes in the narrative 
around ADSs, particularly perceived public backlashes, impact legislative support? 
Throughout Chapters 1 and 2, I trace the history of ADSs as a natural evolution of 
bureaucratic systems and unpack the characteristics of ADSs that may be attractive to 
policymakers. In Chapter 3, I use a game-theoretic model to explore the way that ADSs 
are used to expand legislative control over bureaucratic decision-making. In Chapter 4, I 
use an empirical model to analyze legislative support for criminal justice legislation in 
U.S. state legislatures over the period 2012-2018, I provide evidence that suggests that 
inclusion of ADSs did increase some forms of legislative support for bills that included 
them, but that these effects were eroded and then overcome in later years by the 
recent critical turn and public backlash against ADSs. Lastly, I conclude my dissertation 
by discussing possible research avenues for future scholarly work on governmental 
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Algorithmic Decision Systems (ADS) have grown into a new and expanding 
avenue to influence social policy. ADS are automated, data-driven processes used for 
decision-making purposes. These technical decision systems are automated processes that 
assess information and return an analysis. Generally, ADSs fall into two categories: 
“decision making systems” (i.e., fully automated ADS) and “Decision Aiding Systems” 
(i.e., systems which inform or guide)1 (Selinger and Seager 2012). Algorithmic decision-
making systems process information and then automatically issue a decision, such as 
credit scoring systems that automatically result in loan decisions. While, algorithmic 
decision-aiding systems produce information or “suggestions” that are intended to guide 
the human responsible for making the decision. For instance, while mobile health apps 
that track and suggest food and exercise do not explicitly require the user to follow a 
“healthy” routine, the apps recommend and endorse specific behaviors with the intention 
of altering the user’s actions (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Yeung 2017). ADSs are often 
software-based systems; however, the level of sophistication of ADSs range in 
complexity and technological sophistication. Technical approaches include (but are not 
limited to): simple rule-based systems, inferential statistical methods, machine learning  
                                                
1 Most examples discussed will focus on algorithmic decision aiding systems of varying strengths. Where 
appropriate, I will also use names of types of  ADS systems, most often “risk assessments.” Also, to aid in 
ease of approachability for scholars from different backgrounds, I also use the terms algorithmic policies 
and algorithmic decision frameworks interchangeably with ADS. For full definitions and descriptions of 




(ML) methods, and  even applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In some 
circumstances, this term may also be appropriate for actuarial processes that do not 
require software. ADSs are ubiquitous in the private sector (e.g., Google’s search results, 
Netflix’s movie recommendations, Facebook Friend Suggestions, etc.) and have also 
been gaining momentum in public and governing spaces, ranging from courtrooms2 to 
classrooms3 and welfare offices4.  
Throughout the late 20th century and the very beginning of the 21st century, this 
software was viewed as a beneficial and objective approach to government decision 
making, emphasizing a turn toward “data-driven decisions” and “evidence-based policy” 
(Perri 2002, Marston and Watts 2003). However, as Algorithmic Decision Systems began 
to affect nearly every facet of life in much of the world, including what we read5, what 
we watch,6 where we work,7 who we have friendships and relationships with,8 and how 
we vote9 to name only a few, the popular narrative began to shift rapidly. By the mid-
                                                
2 Examples include algorithmic needs assessments to determine possible treatments or interventions for a 
defendant (such as substance abuse rehabilitation), algorithmic pretrial risk assessments that assess an 
arrestee’s likelihood of missing a court date or committing a new crime if released on bail, and software 
used to aid decisions related to sentencing (Bechtel et al. 2017; Kehl, Guo, and Kessler 2017). 
3 Examples include algorithms that determine a child’s assigned school (McKinley 2010), algorithms that 
aid in college admissions (Baig 2018), and risk assessments that alert administrators to students who may 
be at risk for dropping out (Berens et al. 2018).  
4 Examples include automated eligibility software that determines if an applicant will receive public 
assistance, such as Medicaid, food stamps, and cash-assistance, as well as the amount or level of assistance 
provided (Eubanks 2018). 
5 Examples include news aggregator programs like Apple’s News app. 
6 Most content streaming services integrate some type of recommender system, including Netflix, Hulu, 
and Amazon Prime Video. 
7 For instance, many companies use ADSs to determine qualified candidates within a set of applicants 
(Raghavan 2019). 
8 Examples include Facebook or LinkedIn suggestions for new contacts and any number of dating websites 
and apps such as Match.com or Tinder ( Eslami et al. 2014, Gillespie 2014) 





2010s, the adoption of decision systems within national, state, and local government 
agencies sparked concerns regarding the ethical and legal implications of the design and 
implementation of the systems (see Mittelstadt et al. 2016). Headlines shifted from 
enthusiastic techno-optimism in the early 2010s10 to dystopian descriptions of 
technology11 by 2016.  
The critical turn in the narrative about ADSs is indicative of the fact that they are, 
contrary to an ‘objective’ framing, inherently political artifacts. This shift has fueled a 
significant amount of scholarly interest in understanding the potential and observed 
impacts of deploying ADSs in social environments. This work has uncovered what 
should have been initially obvious: that ADSs are engaged in making political decisions 
based on, often unstated, values codified into the structure of these systems. ADSs are 
employed in a variety of situations that can involve determinations of who receives state 
resources and services, like welfare or other social aid, to who is likely to be at an 
increased risk of policing or incarceration; decisions which are inherently political in 
nature and cannot be determined without some pre-existing value system in place. The 
major goal of this dissertation is to elucidate some of the specific ways that ADSs 
manifest as political phenomena, foremost among them: how ADSs are a natural 
extension of the evolution of bureaucratic politics; how the public, media, and scholars 
engage with ADSs as an extension of debates over fundamentally political notions like 
                                                
10 For instance, Fast Company’s 2012 headline “Fighting Violent Gang Crime With Math” (Coren 2012) 
which describes a predictive policing algorithm used by the LAPD. 
11 For instance, The New York Times 2017 article “Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret 
Algorithm” or The Economist’s 2018 piece entitled “How data-driven policing threatens human freedom” 




fairness, ethics, and justice; and how ADSs can have potentially important impacts on 
explicitly political processes, like support for and passage of legislation. 
  
Project Purpose and Motivation 
Society is at a major inflection point in which citizens, legislators, and bureaucrats 
must decide how to respond to the real-world effects of digitization. Algorithmic 
processes are deeply ingrained in almost every facet of individuals’ lives in much of the 
world, and many people and organizations are becoming more aware of the significance 
of computational technologies in the physical world (Crawford 2017; Mayson 2019). In 
particular, government adoption of ADSs has caused significant concern (Werth 2019; 
Mayson 2019). In addition to the broad public implications of structural and procedural 
changes to any government institution, the applications of ADSs have tended to have a 
greater effect on marginalized and vulnerable populations (Eubanks 2018). For example, 
in just a few of the government cases noted previously (see footnotes 3-5), algorithmic 
decision systems have become ingrained in school assignment decisions meant to combat 
racial segregation (McKinley 2010), judicial processes rife with economic and racial 
prejudice during pretrial detainment decisions (Bechtel et al. 2017; Kehl, Guo, and 
Kessler 2017), and public service processes for decisions regarding requests for basic 
nutrition assistance and advanced medical needs (Eubanks 2018).  
Dreams of automated technologies bringing in a new age of justice and equality 
have been overshadowed by concerns for computational technology’s harmful 




investigative journalism organization. This exposé  argued that a popular sentencing 
algorithm called COMPAS.12  was “biased against blacks.” Specifically, the authors  
found that COMPAS was twice as likely to assign high risk scores to black defendants 
in comparison to their white counterparts despite, on average, black defendants being 
significantly less likely to commit future crimes (Angwin et al. 2016). While the 
ProPublica article received significant pushback from the creator of COMPAS, 
Northpointe Inc.  and others (see Corbett-Davies et al. 2017), it also spurred academic 
and industry interest in the topic of fairness in algorithmic systems (Courtland 2018). 
This critical narrative quickly spread to the popular press (Crawford 2017, Whittaker et 
al. 2018).  
 Algorithmic decision systems can initially seem like a niche concern for so much 
attention; normally this level of scrutiny is not applied to a specific policy tool, but rather 
larger policy areas with multiple competing policy prescriptions. However, ADSs are 
unique in that they are a relatively new policy intervention (in their current form) that has 
nonetheless found rapid success at being introduced and enacted in various legislative 
areas. For example, and I will discuss this at length in Chapter 4, over the preceding 7 
years, in the field of criminal justice policy alone, 59 pieces of legislation involving 
ADSs were successfully passed and enacted across 46 states in the U.S; an additional 57 
                                                
12 COMPAS is an algorithm that analyzes a number of demographic, social, and physiological factors in a 
publicly unknown way (its underlying processes and weights are proprietary information) to derive an 
estimate for how much of a ‘risk’ an arrestee is for fleeing from their court date or committing a new crime 
if released on bail. This risk score is presented to a judge at a pretrial bond hearing (discussed further in 
Chapter 4) with the intention of informing the judge’s decision as to whether to release an arrestee and 




were introduced in 2018 alone, with 9 of them eventually being enacted. These systems 
are being deployed in situations that intimately affect people’s daily lives, from 
determining child protective service investigations to who gets released from jail. These 
systems are potentially affecting millions of individual’s lives in ways that represent 
some of the most common interactions between citizens and their respective states. 
 However, as important as these interactions and micro-level outcomes are, the 
implementation of technologies like ADSs can irrevocably change a policy landscape, 
ultimately making it more difficult to make future progress (see Whittaker et al. 2018). 
On the other hand, implementation of ADSs may break up long-standing, path-dependent 
processes, opening up the opportunity for changes that otherwise would not be able to 
occur. Furthermore, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, ADSs may serve to improve policy 
outcomes relative to currently biased or discriminatory status quos (Mayson 2019). 
However, scholars and policy observers also contend ADSs may only serve to obfuscate 
and reify existing prejudices and harms. The state of the literature on algorithmic policies 
is rife with these types of competing claims, and the stakes are high. Further cementing 
harmful systems with the veneer of scientific and technological objectivism would be a 
major normative harm. But, if this is not the case, is the repeated assertion that any 
implementation is harmful having a dampening effect on our willingness to pursue what 
is a viable tool for social progress?  
Destructive trends can appear on both ends of the spectrum. In one scenario, the 
negative narrative could produce a chilling effect on the adoption of ADSs in government 




This scenario already occurred more than once. Due to unmet expectations, funding, and 
interest in the subject of artificial intelligence slowed leading to a series of “AI Winters” 
in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s (Elish and boyd13 2018). In a differing, but equally concerning 
scenario, the public could become exhausted with competing narratives and lose interest 
in creating more ethical expectations and regulations for the use of an ever-growing 
technology (Crawford 2017, Whittaker et al. 2018). It is exactly these types of competing 
claims that require a robust, empirical literature to disentangle competing claims and 
properly identify the relative sizes of various relationships, impacts, and trends. Yet, the 
topic of algorithms and public policy is still very much nascent, which makes this stage 
of research critical. Research being conducted now will set the tenor for how future 
discussion of ADSs are handled by researchers, so it is imperative to pair important 
conceptual and theoretical work with empirics when possible to strengthen the evidence 
and literature on the nature and impacts of ADSs. This is a second major goal of this 
dissertation: to emphasize the need for sociotechnical issues, such as algorithmic decision 
systems, to be situated within prior understandings of political institutions and processes. 
 
State of the Field and Research Objectives 
There is a growing research literature on the social and ethical implications of 
public Algorithmic Decision Systems. Researchers have examined the potential for 
inaccurate and discriminatory predictions (Barocas and Selbst 2016, Zarsky 2016; 
Eubanks 2018), the legality of the use of ADSs in public and private contexts (Doshi-
                                                




Velez and Kortz 2017), issues of transparency and privacy (O’Reilly 2013, Pasquale 
2015, Annany and Crawford 2018), and mechanisms for accountability if an algorithmic 
system results in harm (Diakopoulos 2013; Buhmann, Paßmann, and Fieseler 2019). This 
literature is characterized by two significant trends. One, it is heavily conceptual in 
nature; what empirical evidence exists tends to be qualitative information gained from 
interviews with individuals from targeted populations, or quantitative information 
obtained via surveying targeted populations (See Werth 2019). This is important work, 
both the purely conceptually and empirically, but it is overwhelmingly focused on micro-
level interactions, and fails to capture meso and macro-level14 evidence and relations. For 
a subject that is concerned with systemic level biases and impacts, this is a major space 
for scholarly attention.  
Second, the literature is overwhelmingly comprised of analyses focused on the 
outcomes of ADSs, either in the form of understanding additional effects/externalities 
experienced by targeted populations (O’Neill 2016, Eubanks 2018, Noble 2018) or in the 
form of validation studies that seek to determine how accurate ADSs are with their 
predictions (Cohen and Lowenkamp 2019; see Desmarais, Johnson, and Singh 2016 for a 
meta-analysis). Understanding outcomes in undoubtedly important, but as inherently 
political artifacts, ADSs have potential implications for political processes, and 
understanding these impacts will be just as important as understanding outcomes when 
                                                
14 Meso and macro-level phenomena describe the fundamental location of an interaction of interest. 
Contrasted with micro-level, which focuses on the interactions of individuals, macro-level phenomena 
focus on large systems and structures, like a legislature of policy area, while meso level phenomena can 
describe either bridging interactions between individuals and larger structures or interactions within and 




determining the true impacts of ADSs, their likely future, and how societies characterized 
by the widespread adoption of algorithmic policies may change over time. 
Due to ADS’ scalability and ability to rapidly synthesize information, algorithmic 
decision systems can theoretically provide policymakers and other public officials with 
replicable, empirical predictions while also reducing human subjectivity and lowering the 
costs of often-overburdened governing agencies (Mayson 2019). Opponents15 who 
oppose the use of decision systems in government largely focus on the explicit and 
implicit beliefs and motivations that become deeply ingrained in the design of 
technology, arguing that this can exacerbate current inequalities under the guise of 
objectivity and scientific rigor (O’Neil 2016). The frequent implementation of these 
systems in the lives of society’s most vulnerable, such as defendants in the criminal 
justice system or at-risk children, have caused significant concern over the lack of 
oversight or regulation of this type of software (Kirchner 2015). These debates are 
important and have real effects on the creation and perception of algorithmic decision-
making tools and the broader pieces of legislation they are attached to. However, the 
choice to use these decision systems is not made in a vacuum, but rather implemented 
within complex policy environments by actors with political and institutional motivations 
and constraints.  
                                                
15 Opponents to algorithmic interventions in any given policy area can include policymakers, advocates, 
organized interests, and citizens. Opposition can arise from either concerns about the ethics and legality of 
governmental ADSs, or entrenched interests threatened by the employment of ADS (such as the bail bond 




The choice to support or oppose the adoption of an algorithmic intervention16 is 
not only based on a policymaker’s independent policy goals but also the expected 
behavior of others in the issue area’s policy making space. Therefore, in a traditional 
spatial framework, the support or opposition for algorithmic interventions is also based 
on whether or not this decision is believed to move the policy outcome closer or farther 
away from the legislator’s ideal point, which is embedded in a complex, inherently 
political system. This belief will include a policymaker’s independent policy goals, the 
expected behavior of others in the issue area’s space, and the perceived alternatives to 
implementing an algorithmic intervention. This setup informs the rationale for the formal 
model developed in Chapter 3. 
Continuing in this vein, I analyze how algorithmic interventions affect the policy 
process. This is done through chapters 3 and 4 in three specific ways. The first is to 
unpack some of the possible motivations legislators have for employing decision systems 
in public, governing institutions through the use of a game-theoretic delegation model. 
What is it that legislators believe they will achieve when mandating the use of ADSs in 
legislation? Next, I explore the dynamics that prompted the sudden turn from optimism 
about decision aids to pessimism and critique. These two facets inform two general 
hypotheses that form the basis of the final empirical analysis. From the theory discussion 
in Chapter 2 and the formal model analysis in Chapter 3, I make the argument that there 
is a fundamental structural advantage for ADSs, relative to other policy tools, when 
                                                
16 I use “Algorithmic Interventions” to refer to the choice to use an algorithmic tool, such as decision 




included in legislation that may make algorithmic interventions appealing to legislators. 
However, the nature of the critical turn has generated a backlash against such systems 
that may have eroded these benefits. Tests regarding positive baseline support of 
algorithmic interventions and the potential effect of the subsequent backlash, form the 
basis of the empirical investigation in Chapter 4. 
 
Primary Objectives and Themes 
 The discussion thus far has focused on the three primary objectives of my 
dissertation: 1) demonstrating the inherently strategic, political nature of algorithmic 
decision systems, 2) grounding the discussion over ADSs and society in both a 
conceptual and empirical manner, and 3) focusing on how ADSs have potential impacts 
on political process as well as outcomes. One of the major themes I will discuss 
throughout this dissertation focuses on the tension between systemic, structural 
advantages and the unstable nature of public scrutiny. Much of the public work involved 
in the critical turn and resulting backlash against ADSs has relied on attracting media and 
public attention on ADS usage and adoption by highlighting continued disparities in 
outcomes and making appeals to fairness and human discretion. However, these issues 
are highly context dependent in that they are dependent on the specific nature of the 
algorithmic interventions and broader nature of public attentiveness and attitudes around 
these issues. As algorithmic policies change and adapt, as the public engages and 
interacts with them more often, and as more issues continue to compete for the attention 




interventions is just as likely to change. However, systemic advantages, if they exist, are 
only likely to change if something fundamental about the system changes. Therefore, for 
scholars to gain a proper understanding of the continued, if any, role of ADSs and the 
impacts they may have on society, it is important to understand these potential systemic 




In the next chapter I will unpack my conceptual framework and discuss key 
concepts. I begin by examining the historical roots of the quest for stable, impartial, rule-
based governmental procedures (e.g., the concept of the “rule of law”) and the trajectory 
leading to the modern bureaucratic state, the popularity of “evidence-based policy” and, 
eventually, algorithmic decision systems. In this way, I establish ADSs as a natural 
evolution of the same explicitly political processes and tensions that inform the nature of 
bureaucratic politics and the administrative state. Next, I will connect the characteristics 
(or the perceived characteristics) of algorithmic decision systems with the American 
political process in order to illustrate the motivations and goals that may have led to the 
rapid increase in the digitization of governmental decision processes. I then discuss the 
causes and consequences of the expanding oppositional narratives, which claim that 
inclusion of algorithmic decision systems will only reify and expand problems of 
inequality. I conclude by summarizing these concepts and discussing their relationships 





Chapter 3 uses a game-theoretic model in order to understand how characteristics 
of decision systems, specifically the prospect of enabling a legislator's indirect political 
control of policy implementation, may motivate the legislator to support policies that 
include decision systems. Previous research has emphasized the role that bureaucratic 
behavior has in influencing policy making. This is because of a fundamental principal-
agent problem17 within policymaking. That is, the legislator (i.e., the principal) must 
allow some on-the-ground discretion within legislation in order to account for real-time 
changes or unexpected contexts. However, increased discretion given to bureaucrats and 
other practitioners comes with an increased risk that they will use this discretion in a way 
that is contrary to the legislators’ goals or intentions (either for political or other reasons) 
(McCubbins et al. 1987, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, Bendor and Meirowitz 2004, 
Gailmard 2009). Using a game-theoretic model informed by the canonical approach taken 
by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), I examine the ways in which decision systems could 
be viewed as a tool to moderate bureaucratic discretion and increase legislative control 
over policy implementation. My analysis expands on previous formal models that 
examine the competing legislative goals of political control versus policy flexibility in the 
face of unpredictable change. The game-theoretic approach models the strategic 
interactions between the legislative principal and the bureaucratic agent. It expands on 
previous models by allowing the legislature to include an algorithmic constraint that 
                                                
17 That is, the agent (i.e., the bureaucracy) can act on behalf of the principal (i.e., the legislature) (Weingast 




changes over time (corresponding with a machine learning algorithm’s ability to adapt 
given new information). This algorithmic constraint can be applied with varying authority 
(i.e., how binding the algorithmic output is on the policy). The findings suggest that 
under normal conditions18, legislators may be incentivized to support legislation that 
includes algorithmic decision systems. This may be, in part, due to the characterization 
that the decision system will expand the legislators’ political control over final on-the-
ground policy outcomes by utilizing the algorithm to dynamically constrain bureaucratic 
discretion and keep realized policy outcomes closer to the legislator’s preference. The 
findings from this model provide one of the major conceptual pillars for ADSs having 
structural advantages. To the extent that ADSs help solve, or at least improve, the 
principal-agent problem at the heart of delegatory decisions, they provide a clear 
advantage over other similar policy tools. These advantages can potentially help 
propagate ADSs in other legislative areas and maintain their usage over time. 
 
Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I explore how inclusion of an ADS relates to support for legislation. 
Specifically, I examine the impact of risk assessment algorithms on successfully passed 
criminal justice legislation across all fifty states for the period 2012-2017, and introduced 
                                                
18 Normal conditions in the context of a game-theoretic model refers to under conditions of equilibrium, 
i.e., when all actors in the game are playing their optimal strategies, and changes by any player would result 
in less preferable outcomes for that player. There is significant discussion, not previewed here, concerning 
how ‘true’ a constantly optimized equilibrium is in the real world, i.e., actors can make mistakes or 
incorrectly identify their preferences. I sidestep these very valid concerns by focusing on the situation 





criminal justice legislation, regardless of passage, in 2018. I do so by analyzing three 
outcome variables that reflect legislative support: bipartisan support, number of co-
authors, and eventual enactment (only for 2018 data). 
Pretrial risk assessments offer a useful test for both the systemic advantages as 
well as the temporal nature of public scrutiny. This is because pretrial risk assessments 
have seen a significant number of attempts at adoption throughout criminal justice 
legislation over the past decade, but also because these risk assessment algorithms serve 
as one of the main focal points for the critical turn and eventual backlash against ADSs. 
However, it is important to recognize that each algorithmic decision system is embedded 
within a unique context and these contexts also help establish the fundamental political 
nature of ADSs more broadly. Rather than analyzing a defendant’s past and projecting 
the likelihood of violent crime in the future, an algorithm could, theoretically, assess 
different rehabilitation programs to better understand how to produce positive outcomes 
for defendants, either individually or as a population, in the future. However, each of 
these problem frames is only approachable through certain kinds of methods and models. 
Each design decision further refines and shapes what the model is fundamentally capable 
of, as well as what the outputs will be, but this level of technical sophistication is often 
obscured to both policymakers and the general public (Hannah-Moffat 2015, Elish and 
boyd 2018). This represents a gap between the ideation of an algorithmic decision system 
and the mechanisms that will be responsible for translating these intentions into the 
software that will be implemented. Through the use of pretrial risk assessments as a focal 




jointly advance all three of the major goals of the dissertation: explicit political-ness, 
inclusion of empirical evidence, and focus on political processes. 
 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the findings of the prior chapters, 
contextualizing the findings within the broader algorithm and society literature, and 
outlining future research avenues. The increasing adoption of decision-aiding 
technologies and the quick pace of technical advancement require social scientists to 
better understand technology as a part of the policy process and the sociopolitical 
consequences of that technology’s implementation. 
Prior to outlining a potential research agenda, I reflect on the major theme of the 
dissertation. I focus the discussion on how focusing research on explicitly understanding 
the politics and process implications of ADSs in an empirical manner can provide 
valuable insights into the major questions and concerns facing scholars, practitioners, and 
affected individuals in the field. Only by understanding these larger meso and macro-
level facets of ADSs and politics can we build robust, transparent systems that leverage 
the potential benefits of such systems while providing mechanisms for identifying and 





Chapter 2  
Theoretical Discussion and State of the Literature 
 
This chapter will unpack my conceptual and theoretical arguments regarding 
potential systemic advantages of algorithmic interventions. I begin by examining the 
intellectual and institutional roots of the pursuit for a stable, impartial, rule-based 
government (i.e., the concept of the “Rule of Law”) and the trajectory leading to the 
modern bureaucratic state, the popularity of “evidence-based policy” and, eventually, 
algorithmic decision systems. In this way, I establish ADSs as a natural evolution of the 
same explicitly political processes and tensions that inform the nature of bureaucratic 
politics and the administrative state. Next, I will connect the characteristics (or the 
perceived characteristics) of algorithmic decision systems with the American political 
process in order to illustrate the motivations and goals that may have led to the 
digitization of governmental decision processes. I then discuss the causes and 
consequences of the expanding oppositional narratives, which claim that inclusion of 
algorithmic decision systems will only reify and expand problems of inequality. I 
conclude with a discussion of key concepts and terms and the next steps within this 
dissertation. Connections between these ideas and my research questions, hypotheses, 
and methodology will be discussed throughout.  
 
The Rule of Law and the Administrative State 
The idea that government should consist of stable, impartial, rule-based 




this concept requires that all individuals and entities are “accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated [and] equally enforced” (Tolbert and Solomon 2006). This 
philosophy is discussed by numerous political theorists dating back to at least Aristotle 
and underpins much of foundational early American political thought. Political observers 
and intellectuals, such as John Locke (1690/2016) and Thomas Paine (1776/2003), 
emphasized the rule of law’s contrasts to monarchy’s divined superiority and arbitrary 
use of power (Tamanaha 2004, O’Donnell 2010). 
Despite its long intellectual history, the execution of the ideals of stable, 
impartial, rule-based procedures have been difficult to perfect. In modern governments, 
these principles have been pursued through the creation of an extensive administrative 
state and bureaucratic system (Beetham 1996). Max Weber argued that bureaucratic 
administration “increased calculability” of the state, decreasing the likelihood of 
unpredictable interactions between the citizen and the state (Weber 1968; also see Vogl et 
al. 2019). Bureaucracies also lessened shocks of institutional and political changes by 
creating non-elected positions to administer laws and create processes to retain and share 
information (Redford 1958, Dunleavy et al. 2006, Vogl 2019). Over the latter part of the 
20th century, the adoption of basic information technologies strengthened these 
characteristics by increasing storage capacity (elongating institutional memory) and 
expanding informational accessibility to both other state institutions and citizens 






The Development of Modern Bureaucracy 
Bureaucratic routines and structures have lent some stability and consistency to 
state-individual interactions, they are imperfect mediums of the ideals of the Rule of 
Law. Some of this imperfection can be attributed to the fact that the institutions are rule-
based, but the interpretation and implementation of those rules are reliant on the 
inconsistent use and misuse of judgment and discretion by human agents (Maynard-
Moody and Portillo 2010). Despite consistent procedural mechanisms and routines, each 
human decision-maker is apt to respond in a different way to the same information, and 
the same decision-maker may even have difficulty evenly responding to similar situations 
with contextual differences (See Kahneman 2011, Bargh et al. 2012). This variation 
within and between individuals is due to complex and individualized cognitive processes 
and biases19 that may result in implicit prejudices being integrated into policy 
implementation (Dovidio et al. 2002). Cognitive biases may be exacerbated by the fact 
that public officials often make dozens of life-altering decisions daily, which requires a 
fast pace that may increase the likelihood of errors or biases in decision-making going 
unnoticed. Bureaucrats may also either purposefully manipulate or modify procedures to 
align with their own preferences (known as bureaucratic drift) (Shepsle 1992; Béland, 
Rocco, and Waddan 2016) or to accommodate unreasonable demands (Lipsky 1980; 
Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011) or the slippage between a complex individualized 
                                                
19 Cognitive biases are unconscious, systematic errors in thinking processes ((Dovidio et al. 2002; 




situation and a simplistic state categorization scheme (Prottas 1970, Maynard-Moody and 
Portillo 2010).   
 
Discretion as Political Power           
Early theories about bureaucratic power and discretion focused exclusively on 
high-ranking administrative elites, with no attention to frontline staff (Stein 1952), but 
subsequent research, starting with Michael Lipsky in the 1970s, found that “street-level 
bureaucrats20” may have significantly more power than most, or perhaps any, other actors 
in the system. Lipsky (1980) described these on-the-ground government employees as 
“the ultimate policymakers” because they are the arbiter of the last interaction and thus 
the final say of any citizen-state interaction. As Handler (1990) states  
“[d]espite the masses of legislation, rules, regulations, and administrative 
orders, most large, complex administrative systems are shot through with 
discretion from the top policy-makers down to the line staff—the inspectors, 
social workers, intake officers, police, teachers, health personnel, and even 
clerks. How they interpret the rules, how they listen to the explanations, 
how they help the citizen or remain indifferent, all affect the substance and 
quality of the encounter, an encounter made increasingly important because 
of our widespread dependence on the mod-ern state.” (3–4)  
    
Indeed, as Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011) argue, discretion “is ineradicable” in 
that bureaucrats “almost always know some way to push a decision in a preferred 
direction” (225). However, the authors note that the ways in which frontline bureaucrats21 
                                                
20 Street-Level Bureaucratic Theory (SLBT) refers to administrative discretion and judgment administered 
by government agents on the “front lines” (i.e., in direct contact with citizens), including police officers, 
social workers, teachers, and lower-level judges and court administrators (Lipsky 1989; also see Maynard-
Moody and Portillo 2010). 




can exercise discretion varies and that the bureaucrats’ “preferred direction” is often both 
responsive to policy demands and beneficial to the citizens with whom they are 
interacting (225-226). 
Bureaucratic discretion is also embedded in the need to transform messy social 
situations into clean, generalizable categories defined in policies (Lipsky 1980, Prager 
2007). For instance, in a welfare policy requiring unemployment beneficiaries to be 
“actively seeking employment,” a caseworker could decide if rejecting certain 
employment given personal circumstances, such as costs or availability of childcare, 
violates this requirement (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Similarly, many policies 
would be impractical to apply with limited time or resources. For instance, one police 
officer may not be capable of stopping every vehicle going even one mile over the speed 
limit, so they must decide which vehicles they will stop versus which they will ignore 
(Skolnick 1966; Brown 1981).  
While some scholars and activists emphasize the need for, and benefit of, 
bureaucratic discretion and human empathy and judgment within state-citizen 
interactions, others have voiced staunch opposition to on-the-ground flexibility, arguing 
that it violates democratic hierarchies by subverting the will of elected officials or that it 
provides avenues for abuses of power and barriers to accountability (see Workman, 
Jones, and Jochim 2010). These opponents have sought to pinpoint and decrease, or even 






Political Controls and Constraints  
Scholars studying this topic from a legislature-centric perspective have largely 
viewed legislative delegation to the bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship in 
which the agent (i.e., the bureaucracy) can act on behalf of the principal (i.e., the 
legislature) (Weingast 1984, Krause 2010). Problems arise when the agents act in a way 
contrary to the interests of the principal (McCubbins et al. 1987, Besley and McLaren 
1993, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). This research 
emphasizes that deviation from the legislature’s policy intent may be a consequence of 
politically or ideologically motivated bureaucrats who may intentionally sabotage or 
subvert the execution of the policy (Gailmard 2002), the ability for the agents to 
understand and interpret both the intention of the policy and how to best achieve its ends 
(Bendor and Meirowitz 2004), or to the institution's capacity which may not give the 
agency the needed resources to effectively implement the policy (Huber and McCarty 
2004). Each of these circumstances requires different actions to successfully overcome 
the issue and achieve the policymaker’s desired outcome.  
Policymakers can attempt to confine bureaucratic agency by legislating rules and 
procedures that require, monitor, or enforce certain actions. However, even if 
policymakers could structure rigid enough mechanisms to control bureaucrats 
completely, there are many reasons why this would be harmful to policy outcomes. 
Legislators recognize that laws must be generalizable enough to be applied to many 
contextually different cases. However, legislators also want to preclude bureaucrats from 




(Bawn 1995). Thus, policymakers must engage in a strategic balancing act to manage the 
benefits and challenges of bureaucratic delegation (Krause 2010). 
Unfortunately for legislators, balancing bureaucratic independence and policy 
control can be difficult to achieve. For instance, too much political control over a 
bureaucrat’s actions limits their ability to gather and react to new information but giving 
bureaucrats too much agency may result in significant policy drift22. Furthermore, any 
increased uncertainty regarding bureaucratic competency may stymie policymakers’ 
willingness to support legislation in a given area because of their uncertainty regarding 
ultimate policy outcomes (Noll 1983). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations with fewer 
resources (that may not have the staff, knowledge, or material resources to effectively 
execute a policy), can lower the incentives for policymakers to reform the policy area 
given the uncertainty about the bureaucrats’ willingness or ability to comply with any set 
policy demands (Huber and McCarty 2004). And, as discussed above, extending control 
over, or even knowledge of, street-level bureaucrats' use of discretion includes further 
challenges.  
 
Technology in Bureaucracy 
The most straightforward mechanism for achieving bureaucratic constraints is for 
legislators to adopt increasingly rigid procedures and reporting requirements. However, 
some studies have shown that highly rigid structures are often impractical to implement 
                                                






with finite resources and difficult to monitor given the vast number of state-citizen 
interactions (Prottas 1979, Brown 1981). This challenge has been met more recently by 
the adoption of surveillance technologies that can better monitor and track large numbers 
of cases. These technologies are often directed at both government agents, such as in the 
case of police dashcams or automated welfare case management systems (Brown 1981; 
Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011), and the public, through systems like employment 
monitoring and analysis of public service use (Gilliom 2001, Hannah-Moffat 2015, 
Eubanks 2018, also see Maynard-Moody and Portillo 2010). 
 
Algorithmic Decision Systems as Bureaucratic Constraints  
I argue that Algorithmic Decision Systems are a new kind of policy alternative 
that may be perceived by policymakers as a mechanism to constrain bureaucratic 
discretion while maintaining the intent of the original legislation and aligning with the 
ideals of the Rule of Law. In addition to the decision to fully automate a decision, ADSs 
can also be designed to influence or “guide” a decisionmaker using mechanisms that steer 
individuals toward making a certain decision, but does not explicitly constrain their 
behavior in any way (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Similarly, as computational tools, they 
provide a record to monitor or evaluate bureaucratic actions, extending the scope of other 
information technology systems by not only recording decisions but also comparing it to 
a predicted or advised alternative (Hannah-Moffat 2015). 
Additionally, ADSs may be perceived as providing other institutional benefits, as 




data to provide predictive outputs, thus increasing bureaucratic agency capacity by 
speeding up traditional information-seeking processes and more efficiently directing 
agency resources, such as limited time and staff (Mayson 2019, Vogl et al. 2019). These 
algorithmically produced results would also potentially enable bureaucrats to respond to 
contextual differences in predictable ways despite the increasing societal and institutional 
complexity of the modern world (Vogl et al. 2019). 
 I apply the legislative pursuit of controlling bureaucrats and the idealization of 
stability, impartiality, and rule-based systems to analyze my first research question:  
Research Question 1: What Motivates Policymakers to Support 
Algorithmic Decision Systems?  
 
(Mis)Perceptions of Algorithmic Decision Systems 
Algorithmic processes are generally not well understood by either policymakers 
or the general public (Domingos 2012; Pasquale 2015). In addition to the incentives 
described above, this gives ADSs an amount of vagueness or malleability when discussed 
as policy solutions that may alter traditional political coalitions of support. This is 
important with regard to my second research question:  
Research Question 2: Do the Perceived Features of Algorithmic Decision 
Systems Increase Policymaker Support for ADS-Inclusive Legislation?  
 
Some of the misconceptions or lack of technical understanding about algorithmic 
processes likely stems from the pervasive misconceptions about the current attributes and 
capabilities of predictive software (O’Neil 2016, Elish and boyd 2018). For decades, tech 




problems. Elish and boyd (2018) argue that this narrative went so far as to make 
computational and data-driven tools seem fantastical in a way that promotes the belief 
that they are “unknowable and inscrutable,” which ultimately functions to relieve the 
company of having to validate their tools. Marketing materials go so far as to offer 
Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) services that “work like magic” 
(Selbst, 2017; Elish and boyd 2018).  
So, it follows, that if one believes that a tool is capable of producing objective, 
unbiased predictions (i.e., predictions that produce the correct or “right” outcome), they 
are likely to believe that said outcome will align with their own predictions, given that 
prior studies have shown individuals, and particularly “issue experts”, as having a high 
level of confidence in their own prediction capabilities (Tetlock 2017, also see Kahneman 
2011). In other words, policymakers may support legislation that includes algorithmic 
aids because they believe the policy will be pulled toward their own preferences. 
Opposing interests may believe this while simultaneously supporting the same language 
regarding “data-driven decisions.” I argue that this may enable increased bipartisan 
support for bills that include Algorithmic Decision Systems. I test this theory in Chapter 
4 by analyzing the relationship between inclusion an Algorithmic Decision Systems and 








The Critical Turn: Public Backlash and Popular Narratives 
By the mid-2010s, the adoption of decision systems within national, state, and 
local government agencies had sparked concerns regarding the ethical and legal 
implications of the design and implementation of the systems (see Mittelstadt et al. 
2016), particularly in contrast with the narrative of objectivity previously used. Much of 
the public work involved in the critical turn and resulting backlash against ADSs has 
relied on attracting media and public attention on ADS usage and adoption by 
highlighting continued disparities in outcomes and making appeals to fairness and human 
discretion. However, these issues are highly context dependent in that they rely on the 
specific nature of the algorithmic interventions and broader nature of public attentiveness 
and attitudes around these issues. As algorithmic policies change and adapt, as the public 
engages and interacts with them more often, and as more issues continue to compete for 
the attention of the public, media, and various interest groups, the context around 
algorithmic interventions is just as likely to change. This calls for an analysis that is a 
subset of the previous research question:  
Research Question 2A: Do fluctuations in the narrative about Algorithmic 
Decision Systems alter levels of Legislative Support?  
 
Chapter 4 uses the substantial shift in academic and popular narratives regarding 
Pretrial Risk Assessment Algorithms, a type of ADS, to analyze the impact of variations 
in public discourse over a key time period on support for criminal justice bills that 






Key Concepts and Terminology 
 
Algorithms 
An algorithm, in its most basic form, is a set of rules and procedures that refine or 
synthesize information for problem-solving purposes. Algorithms must have clearly 
specified rules and a finite number of steps to achieve a result (Chabert 1999, McKelvey 
2014). For instance, simple mathematical methods, such as long division, are algorithms. 
These sets of rules do not need to be computational, but computers are faster and more 
reliable at executing explicit rules. When the rules become more complex and involve 
more information, computers process that information in a fraction of the time it would 
take a human. Furthermore, the rapid proliferation of algorithmic systems in the public 
sphere is only possible given computational advancements and a shift by individuals, 
businesses, and governments to turn to increasingly digitized processes (Buhmann, 
Paßmann, and Fieseler 2019).  
 
Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence 
Machine learning refers to an advanced computational algorithm that can respond 
to diverse data semi-autonomously. The key feature of machine learning algorithms is 
that they independently adapt and iterate based on patterns detected within a dataset. 
There are three primary subtypes of learning algorithms: supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning, and reinforced learning. Put simply, supervised learning provides 




detects similar attributes associated with each different data category. It can then apply 
these patterns to unlabeled data to predict its category. Unsupervised learning, however, 
is not given pre-labeled data. Instead, the algorithm analyzes unstructured data that has 
not been categorized in any way and is often used for exploratory analysis and dimension 
reduction. Reinforced learning methods use dynamic feedback (yes/no) after an 
action/decision is made to train the algorithm to behave in a certain way.  
These systems, while not infallible, can rapidly analyze vast quantities of 
information and often provide useful insight into complicated patterns. They are often 
employed to predict the likelihood that a given case falls into a specific category. For 
instance, criminal risk assessments analyze a defendant’s profile (usually containing data 
points regarding criminal history, suspected crime, and personal demographics) to detect 
patterns that it determines are predictive of recidivism based on the patterns learned from 
its training set.  
 
Algorithmic Decision Systems 
 I use the term “Algorithmic Decision System” (ADS) to refer to automated, data-
driven processes used for decision-making purposes. The level of sophistication of these 
ADSs varies widely, but they are often software-based. Technical approaches include 
simple rule-based systems, inferential statistical methods, and a variety of advanced 
machine learning methods (Selinger and Seager 2012, Yeung 2017). In some 
circumstances, this term may also be appropriate for actuarial processes that do not 




also describe these systems as subsets of ADSs such as “decision-making systems” (i.e., a 
fully automated ADS) and “Decision Aids”/”Decision-Aiding Systems” (i.e., decision 
guidance systems); however, most examples discussed, due to current technical 
limitations, will fall within algorithmic decision aiding systems of varying strengths. 
Where appropriate, I will also use names of types of ADS systems, most often “risk 
assessments.” Each of these instruments utilizes different data and methods and may 
produce different types of outputs including numerical scores, specific recommendations, 
or visual indicators (e.g., heat maps that highlight geographical areas as shades of red, 
yellow, and green, ranging from highest to lowest risk area). 
 
Predictive Risk Assessments 
One of the earliest types of algorithmic procedures used in government were 
actuarial processes, which use mathematical rules based on probabilities related to risk. 
Actuarial processes were developed for use in the criminal justice system as early as the 
1920s. However, these algorithmic aids have become increasingly more sophisticated 
with the increase in access to data, the acceleration in computer processing power, and 
the advancement in statistical modeling and machine learning processes.  
This has made algorithmic policies particularly alluring in spaces with complex 
social problems that humans had often proved fallible in addressing. Furthermore, given 
the ability to scale software for significantly less money than increasing the workforce in 
a sector or agency, algorithmic decision systems were seen as a way to increase 




decision systems, often in the form of risk assessments, have rapidly been adopted within 
a variety of criminal justice contexts, including policing, criminal courts, diversion 
programs, and prisons (Werth 2019).  
 
Algorithmic Interventions 
 I use the term “Algorithmic Interventions” to refer to the choice to use an 
algorithmic tool, such as decision systems, as a part of a public policy solution. Such a 
choice can often be at the expense of another policy tool which may have attempted to 
serve a similar purpose, or as a standalone add on to an existing piece of legislation. This 
frames the existence of ADSs as a choice to introduce an algorithm into a policy area, 
and by extension, introduce the attendant effects and impacts an algorithm may have. 
This term is used less often than the other terms discussed above primarily because much 
of the analysis presupposes an algorithmic intervention has already occurred, which is 
why the area is useful for analysis. Nonetheless, this term is important because it not only 
describes specific phenomena of interest, but it also characterizes the legislative process 
broadly, i.e., policy making in the U.S. is currently undergoing an algorithmic 
intervention that needs to be understood in its full scope and impact. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 
This dissertation seeks to unpack the issue of the adoption of legislation that 
includes decision-making and aiding algorithm, collectively described as Algorithmic 




and the implications they may have on both policymaking and implementation, I analyze 
the following questions: 
(1) What Motivates Policymakers to Support Algorithmic Decision Systems?  
 
(2) Do the Perceived Benefits of Algorithmic Decision Systems Increase 
Policymaker Support for ADS-Inclusive Legislation? 
 
(2a) Do fluctuations in the narrative about Algorithmic Decision Systems Alter 
Levels of Legislative Support? 
 
Machine learning technologies may present a tremendous opportunity to leverage 
big data for social reform that is not influenced or corrupted by human bias, but using 
such emerging technologies before they are adequately designed with appropriate 
oversight and discussion among relevant stakeholders, may lead to unexpected social and 
institutional harms. However, the choice to use these decision systems is not made in a 
vacuum, but rather implemented within complex policy environments by actors with 
political and institutional motivations and constraints. My dissertation seeks to unpack 
the adoption of ADSs in order to better understand some of the causes and consequences 








Algorithmic Decision Systems as Policy Tools 
 
Algorithmic Decision Systems are becoming deeply integrated in the institutional 
design of governing systems. Outside of full automation, these systems provide scores, 
recommendations, or other advisory information and are ultimately meant to inform, 
influence, or alter the discretion of human actors. For instance, this may be in the form of 
providing restrictions that the human actor must act within, such as when an algorithmic 
score set a discretionary floor or ceiling (for example, an output that suggests a criminal 
sentence no less than 5 years or no more than 5 years) within a set range of decisions. In a 
less rigid system, an algorithmic decision aid may primarily influence decisions through 
informational framing, such as when an actor is not required to incorporate the 
information provided by the algorithm, but still has seen it and may be cognitively 
“nudged” or influenced in some manner either consciously or subconsciously (Yeung 
2017; also see Sunstein 2014). Some of the most well-known decision-aiding software 
are used within criminal justice. For instance, predictive policing software used to 
allocate policing resources based on a crime occurring in a certain location or being 
committed by a specific person.23 However, many similar systems are used throughout 
other governing and public institutions, ranging from welfare distribution to child safety 
assessments. While this software is often procured solely at the discretion of the agency 
                                                
23	Geographical clusters, often illustrated using heat maps, are a more dominant framework for predictive 
policing software; however, other frameworks, such as Chicago’s “Strategic Subject List (SSL), often 




or institution in which it will be used, increasingly, policymakers are considering 
including the mandatory adoption of these tools within legislation.  
The following chapter argues that the inclusion of algorithmic decision aids in 
legislation is a burgeoning and unique policy tool that can enable decisionmakers to 
mitigate policy drift.24 In particular, the flexibility and dynamic nature of algorithmic aids 
can supplement discretion bands or other traditional bureaucratic constraints. However, 
these same qualities also ensure a substantial level of political and policy flexibility in the 
implementation and use of these tools. To illustrate this, I explore the ways in which the 
legal rigidity of the algorithmic aid can be adjusted based on the policymaker’s 
preferences for the outcome and their confidence in the end-actor’s25 willingness and 
ability to execute the spirit of the policy, as well as the ways that the end-actor may 
respond to those constraints. The intent of this analysis is to unpack and analyze the 
contexts in which algorithmic systems are adopted and the consequences of these choices 
utilizing a formal game-theoretic framework.  
The use of a formal game-theoretic framework allows for the exploration of how 
a system, represented by the game-theoretic model, may change as aspects of the system 
are changed. This substantially advances two major goals of the dissertation: first, by 
analogizing the inclusion of ADSs in legislation to a situation of bureaucratic delegation 
by a legislator, I explicitly make the argument that ADSs are political artifacts in the 
                                                
24	Policy drift refers to policy change that occurs outside of formal legislative reform (Béland, Rocco, & 
Waddan 2016). 
25 In the context of algorithmic decision aids, the end-actor may be any actor who will ultimately execute a 





same way that other types of constraints and grants of powers to bureaucracy, like rule 
making authority or menu laws, are inherently political artifacts. This is in line with the 
discussion from the prior chapter that argued that ADSs are a natural evolution of 
bureaucratic processes. Second, relying on a game-theoretic model allows for an explicit 
evaluation of the impact of ADSs on a part of the legislative process. For instance the 
following model explicitly unpacks how the of an ADS changes the equilibrium level of 
discretion and the level of legislator support for delegation to a bureaucrat, in relation to 
these equilibrium levels when an algorithmic decision system is not included. This 
focuses on understanding how use and adoption of ADSs has specific process impacts, in 
this specific example, by helping legislators curtail bureaucratic drift and alleviate the 
costs associated with the principal agent problem involved with delegating policy making 
authority to a bureaucrat. This model also ties into the broader theme of how ADSs may 
have broader systemic advantages, relative to other policy tools, that may make them 
may help them propagate through different policy areas. 
 
Background 
Governments have been integrating cyber technologies for more than half a 
century, but the social and technical advancement of these technologies has recently 
positioned them to expand beyond simple tools of efficiency and into key points of public 
policy. These tools are sometimes adopted by a specific agency or actor, for instance, by 
a police department, but they are also increasingly included in legislation, meaning that 




The choice to support or oppose the adoption of an ADS is not only based on a 
policymaker’s independent policy goals, but also the expected behavior of others in the 
issue area’s policy making space. Therefore, in a traditional spatial framework, the 
decision to include this software into legislation is also based on how this action may or 
may not move the outcome closer or farther away from the policymaker’s ideal point, 
which is embedded in a complex multi-actor system. Algorithmic aids may encourage 
policymakers with differing goals to support the same legislation. This may occur due to 
the opacity and complexity of the technology. For example, these programs are often 1- 
proprietary, which limits access to understanding their inner workings (Pasquale 2015) 
and 2- the technology’s highly complex attributes, which have rendered the rational or 
process for machine learning outputs uninterpretable to humans (Weinberger 2019). This 
confusing landscape is often veiled with the idea that Machine Learning (ML) outputs are 
mathematical truths and purely scientific. Thus, anyone who believes that their own 
rationale is objective and reflective of the truth may think that an “objective,” “scientific” 
algorithm will produce the same conclusions that they have come to, for instance, that 
many defendants are dangerous and should be locked away or, conversely, that most 
defendants’ crimes were highly contextual and that they do not pose a threat to society 
and should not be incarcerated. This may persuade policymakers on different sides of an 
issue to support a bill with algorithmic decision aids that will help to guide decisions 
toward the “right” outcome, which competing sides can rationalize as being parallel to 





A Legislative Perspective of Bureaucratic Discretion 
A core foundation of modern representational democracies rests in their ability to 
accommodate the participation of a complex set of actors within the governing process. 
Thus, the primary decision makers in a democratic system must anticipate how their 
preferences will be executed if they want the outcome to align with their objectives. 
Many institutional, behavioral, and circumstantial dynamics may cause the outcome to 
differ from the decision makers’ initial intent. To counter such policy drift, a decision 
maker may employ specific strategies or institutional tools. For example, legislators,26 
who must depend on varying levels within the bureaucracy to correctly interpret and 
effectively execute their legislation, must decide what discretionary choices to allow the 
bureaucrats, such as what aspects of a policy must be mandatory or otherwise difficult to 
avoid or alter.  
One might think that for the legislator to ensure cooperation, they should make 
their policies as rigid as possible in order to deter bureaucrats from intentionally or 
unintentionally straying from the intent of the policy. However, prior studies have shown 
that, from the principal policymaker’s standpoint, there is a delicate balance between 
political control and agency flexibility (McCubbins et al. 1987, Besley and McLaren 
1993, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). More rigid policies, 
such as three-strike laws, may enable policymakers to more precisely dictate policy 
implementation, but this would also limit bureaucrats’ ability to respond to new 
                                                
26 Many of these examples will be illustrated in the context of principal decisionmakers, such as 
policymakers/ legislators and subsequent agents, such as bureaucrats; however, the analysis is relevant to 




information or changing circumstances on the ground which may threaten the ultimate 
success of the policy. It also neglects to take advantage of the substantive expertise of an 
agency or even dissuade competent, well-trained bureaucrats from service (Besley and 
McLaren 1993). Thus, policymakers must balance the desire for bureaucrats to 
dynamically adjust policies based on the bureaucrat’s expertise, as well as their access to 
new or changing information, while also constraining the agents enough to ensure that 
they act in accordance to the spirit of the policy. Deviation from the original intention of 
the policy may be a consequence of politically or ideologically motivated bureaucrats 
who may intentionally sabotage or subvert the execution of the policy (Gailmard 2002), 
the ability for the agents to understand and interpret both the intention of the policy and 
how to best achieve its ends (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004), or to the institution's capacity 
which may not give the agency the needed resources to effectively implement the policy 
(Huber and McCarty 2004). Each of these circumstances requires different actions to 
successfully overcome the issue and achieve the policymaker’s desired outcome.  
Strategic legislators may attempt to account for these competing challenges when 
crafting legislation. If the policymaker thinks an agency may stray from direct 
implementation of the policy at hand, they then must choose which policy tools will 
restrain those agencies while balancing the harms that may come from restricting the 
agency’s responsiveness to new information or circumstances. Traditional policy tools 
include direct alterations of an agent’s discretionary power. For example, policymakers 
may limit discretion by creating highly rigid procedures, such as mandatory minimums. 




predefined options to choose from or “discretion windows” which allow some choice but 
only within specified bounds (Gailmard 2009). More discretionary power may come in 
the form of open or loosely defined directives. Policymakers must choose which tools 
will best serve their long-term policy objectives, while also balancing the threat of 
opposing decision makers rejecting the entirety of the policy. Such opposition may 
include an executive veto power (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Volden 2002), external 
pressures such as lobbying interests (McCubbins et al. 1987), or competing legislative 
actors or groups who oppose the legislation or cause intra-coalitional conflicts (Horn and 
Shepsle, 1989). 
 
Algorithmic decision systems used as a policy tool.  
Algorithmic decision aids provide policymakers with a new policy tool to use 
when mediating the tradeoffs between control and context. These algorithmic decision 
aids are novel policy tools, in part, because they are a constraining structure that has 
predefined outcomes prescribed by non-policymakers (e.g., software engineers), but also 
in that they could be designed to dynamically change based on real-time input using 
machine learning or changed or revised by being manually updated or retrained. 
Dynamically updating systems refer to machine learning techniques that adjust or “learn” 
from past data to iteratively update predicted outcomes to better fit the circumstances, 
while systems that are manually updated refer to static applications that only change 
when their program is manually entered and altered. Either of these approaches would 




discretionary windows changes to which would require new legislation. This is not to 
necessarily say that these tools are a better policy choice or to argue that the flexibility or 
adaptability of these tools deliver on their promises. However, it is to claim that the way 
that decision makers view these tools will have an impact on their adoption during the 
policy process.  
The adoption of algorithmic decision-making or aiding systems may also be 
paired with further flexibility via the level of legal or procedural authority27 that the 
policy gives the software. A more rigid system could mandate or otherwise require an 
agent to make decisions that are based on the algorithmic assessment. For instance, a 
criminal recidivism risk assessment score of 10 out of 10 at a sentencing hearing could 
require a minimum sentence length of 6 months. Conversely, a less rigid system could be 
deployed as an optional decision aid with no authority. This aid can then be used at the 
agent’s will as supplementary information, such as only providing the judge with a risk 
assessment score without an explicit recommendation so that it may be used as 
supplementary case information.  
There are various moderating choices between these opposing ends of the 
spectrum, such as requiring only some algorithmic outcomes to be binding decisions so 
that more extreme outcomes would have a mandated action associated with them, but in 
the case of more moderate outcomes, actions were left up to the agent. For instance, a 
risk assessment of 9 or higher may require a judge to deny bail, while a score of 5 may be 
                                                
27 Legal rigidity refers to a requirement that the algorithm’s output has an influence on the decision, while 
procedural rigidity refers to when the algorithm’s output is not required to be considered or used, but is due 




left up to the judge’s discretion. This is the case for a child welfare risk assessment used 
by Allegany County, PA. When suspected abuse or neglect is reported to a hotline, a 
volunteer is also given a score that attempts to predict the likelihood of the child being in 
significant danger. The system scores the risk from 1 (very low risk) to 20 (very high-
risk). Most the time, this system is only meant to provide the volunteer with further 
information before deciding whether to open a case which will go to a social worker for 
investigation. However, in cases that score a 20, the highest score, a case is automatically 
opened (Chouldechova et al. 2018). It is also important to consider that even an algorithm 
with less authority may produce de facto adherence to the software’s output or 
suggestion. For instance, in the Allegany County case, many volunteers said that they 
often reconsider their own determination if the algorithm provides a significantly 
different score than they had expected. This is due to their trust in the software being 
objective and effective (Eubanks 2018). This trend may produce unintended 
consequences if legislators are unaware of the effect that scorings and advising systems 
may have even when they are very weak. Both the use of the algorithm and the amount of 




Previous models of delegation decisions have unpacked the complex stages of 
decision-making and execution in a range of scenarios. Many of these studies have 




use to anticipate organizational behavior and policy outcomes. Researchers often focus 
on the ways in which different policy tools and procedures are effectively used by 
legislators to mitigate bureaucratic drift and strengthen political control. The proposed 
model seeks to include algorithmic decision aids within this discussion as a unique policy 
tool that can enable decision principals to mitigate agent drift that 1) create discretionary 
bands of varying strength and legal rigidity and 2) enable more flexible and dynamic 
moderation than traditional bureaucratic constraints. 
This section proceeds by discussing the general form of a delegation model, 
utilizing the canonical Epstein and O’Halloran 1996 model of an interaction between 
Congress (C) and an executive agency (A). This model is generalized to any legislature 
(L) and any bureaucrat (B), who are engaged in a delegatory relationship. L moves first 
by setting a policy (p) with some discretionary band (d), nature then chooses a policy 
shock (𝜔) that is observed by B, who sets the ultimate policy outcome (x). Both L and B 
value x in accordance with their policy preferences, i.e., x is valued based on how small 
the difference between it and the ideal point of L and B, respectively. This model is then 
expanded in two essential ways: 1) a dynamic time component is added to indicate that a 
delegation game is observed over multiple rounds where the legislature only moves once 
at the beginning and the bureaucrat utilizes its discretion to respond to different shocks 
chosen by nature over time, and 2) by adding a constraining algorithm (𝑎) that also 
changes over time, which is used by the legislature to dynamically limit the actual use of 
the bureaucrat’s full discretionary authority. The object is to understand how inclusion of 




chosen by the Legislature. This is done by comparing the equilibrium level of 
discretionary authority (d*) under the original Epstein and O’Halloran and the modified 
algorithmic model. 
The following models build on Epstein and O’Halloran’s 1996 model of 
legislative delegation and agency discretion. The Epstein and O’Halloran model starts 
with a realized outcome: 
𝑥 = 𝑝 + 𝜔 + 𝑑, where  
x is the final policy outcome that is executed in the world,  
p is the policy chosen by an agency,  
𝜔 represents exogenous shocks that may affect the policy and shape the outcome, 
and  
d is the discretion given to the agency 
Traditionally, legislators (or other decision principals) are incentivized to give the 
agency discretion because their expertise and proximity to the issue will mean that only 
the agent will be able to observe 𝜔. In order to balance the tradeoffs of political control 
and bureaucratic expertise, the legislature can set the level of discretion (d) on an interval 
[0,∞), the agency can then choose the specific policy parameters (p), given the 
constraint that 𝑝 ∈ 	 [𝑙, 𝑟] (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Gehlbach 2013).  
I expand this baseline model to illustrate how algorithmic decision aids are used 
within the policy process by adding 𝑎 as an algorithmic policy moderator on agency 
discretion, where 𝑎 is any value between 1 (no algorithmic aid) and 0 (a fully binding 




a constraint. The algorithm dynamically evaluates a set of data and chooses an 
appropriate proportion of an agency’s full discretion that ought to be used to set the 
policy before 𝜔 is actually observed. Thus, an algorithmic output of 𝑎 = 1 would provide 
no constraint on the discretion given to an agency, allowing them full use of their 
delegated authority, d. This equation takes the form of 
 𝑥 = 𝑝 + 𝜔 + 𝑑𝑎, where 
x is the final policy outcome that is executed in the world,  
p is the policy chosen by an agency,  
𝜔 represents exogenous shocks that may affect the policy and shape the outcome,  
d is the discretion given to the agency, and  
𝑎 is the constraint level, bounded on the interval [0,1] chosen by the algorithm28 
 
 By implementing an algorithmic aid, policymakers can both put bounds on 
discretion as well as absorb some amount of exogenous shocks.  
Prior models have found that greater policy uncertainty also increases the cost, 
limiting an agency’s ability to absorb 𝜔. However, the dynamic and flexible nature of the 
algorithmic system may give the principal a way to limit discretion without the full cost 
                                                
28 In the original Epstein and O’Halloran model, d is set on the interval [l,r]; however, introducing a 
moderating factor, a, creates a distinction between the policy level of d set by the Legislator in the initial 
authority granting piece of legislation, and the effective discretionary level, da, which is the actual amount 
of discretion that the Bureaucrat can use to move policy and set the final outcome policy x. In this sense, 
for the current model, the policy level of d is bounded on the interval [0,∞): the Legislator could 
conceivably grant any level of discretionary authority to the Bureaucrat; however, as will be demonstrated 
later in the model, this is done with respect to the expected algorithmic constraint, a, such that the effective 





of unknown exogenous shocks. This is because algorithmic aids, through either machine 
learning processes or manual updates, can be adjusted to exogenous shocks that would 
also affect the level of discretion conveyed to agencies. To represent the fundamental 
learning process over time that the algorithm engages in, in addition to including the 
notion that bureaucratic discretion and policy setting occurs over time, the model 
incorporates time in a dynamic process.  
In this model, 𝑥3 = 𝑝 + 𝜔3 + 𝑑𝑎345, where 𝑡 represents time. To reiterate, x is the 
realized policy implemented in the world after the legislature sets a core policy (p), 
nature chooses a shock (𝜔3), and the bureaucrat applies its algorithmically constrained 
level of discretion (𝑑𝑎345). The main difference between this setup and the Epstein and 
O’Halloran model is that bureaucratic policy setting happens at multiple points in time, as 
opposed to only once after the initial law and initial shock are observed. However, the 
timing of events is also slightly different between the two models. In the current model, 
the timing is as follows:  
(1) a legislature (L), sets a policy (p), a discretion level (d), and authorizes the use 
of a constraining algorithm (a);  
 
(2) the algorithm(a) is trained on prior history and processes that are identified as 
important to a policy area;  
 
(3) the algorithm chooses to constrain the full bureaucratic discretion of an agency 
by some proportion based on prior history and processes(𝑎345);  
 






(5) the agency uses is mediated discretion level (𝑑𝑎345) to implement a policy 
𝑥𝑡 ;  
(6) steps 2-5 are repeated.  
 
The outcome and timing changes introduced by the model require a reevaluation 
of the utility functions from the original E&H model. Their initial work observed the 
following utility functions for Congress (C) and an agency (A): 
𝑈9 = − 𝐶 − 𝑥 < with 𝐶 being Congress’ ideal point and 𝑥 being the outcome policy 
Assume that 𝐶 = 0, so 𝑈9 = −𝑥< 
𝑈= = − 𝐴 − 𝑥 < with 𝐴 being the Agency’s ideal point and 𝑥 being the outcome 
policy29.  
 
Following this setup, but generalizing to a legislator (L) and bureaucrat (B)30, yields the 
following utilities: 
𝑈? = − 𝐿 − 𝑥 < = −𝑥<	
𝑈A = − 𝐵 − 𝑥 <	
 
However, since the algorithmic aid, 𝑎345, would change over time, along with the 
shocks(𝜔), bureaucratic policy, and final outcome policy, the utility evaluations would 
also change over time. This can be illustrated as 
– 𝑥5< + 𝛿 −𝑥<< + 𝑑< −𝑥E< …𝛿G45(−𝑥G<)	
                                                
29 Both C and A are constrained to be on the policy space [l,r].  




with 𝛿 being the discount rate in which 𝛿 ∈ (0,1). This pattern can be simplified into 
summation notation, 𝛿345(−𝑥3<).I3J5  The quantity 𝑥3, the realized policy at time t, 
would be predicated on the information available when the algorithm was updated. 
However, the legislature does not make its choice of policy at every point in time, instead 
delegating to the bureaucrat and the algorithm. Under the assumption that much of the 
purpose of this delegation is to avoid large shifts in outcomes 𝑥 and induce policy 
stability, then the best position for the legislator (L) is to assume that the combined 
discretionary authority and algorithm work to stabilize 𝑥3 to some expected equilibrium 
value 𝑥. While the realized value of x would change over time, thus reverting to 𝑥3 for 
the bureaucrat, the best information that the legislator has to work with is to assume that a 
stable policy is reached on average, in order to effectively evaluate the utility of any 
proposed strategy. Taking this information into account, the summation changes to  
𝛿345 −𝑥<I3J5 ,	
	








However, to simplify some of the math, I have altered the Epstein and O’Halloran 
model to include a shape parameter of E
<
 to the legislator’s utility function, instead of the 
5
<O
 that can be found in the expected utility function of the original model.31 This does not 
change the underlying relationship of the parameters within the model, but rather, the 
                                                
31 R represents the right endpoint of a policy shock space, i.e. a continuum of potential values that a policy 
shock, like a change in unemployment, a natural disaster, or a security incident, could take. R will be 




sensitivity of the utility to changes in the parameters, which does not contribute any 
analytical substance to the point at hand. This results in Equation 1. 
𝑈? 𝑥 = −
3𝑥<
2 1 − 𝛿
	 1 	 
 
A legislator must base their decisions on a longer time horizon, but a bureaucrat 
will interact with the policy in independent cases over time. Legislators make a singular 
policy that must fit a broad range of cases over time, but a bureaucrat will decide when 
and how to implement a policy at the time of each applicable case. To illustrate this, I 
have expanded the model to show the legislator’s utility includes the infinite payoff 
stream while the bureaucrat’s does not. Equation 2 illustrates the difference in the 
bureaucrat’s decision-making process. 
𝑈A 𝑥 = − 𝐵 − 𝑥3 <	 2 		 
 
To analyze the bureaucrat’s decision at each point in time, the equation below 
illustrates that the agency will choose the outcome closest to its ideal point, given its level 
of effective discretion (𝑑𝑎345). Specifically, the first line illustrates when given a shock, 
(−𝜔), that is farther away from their ideal point than their discretion band covers, the 
bureaucrat will move policy to the right as far as their effective discretionary band 
allows. The second line shows that when a shock is sufficiently close to the bureaucrat’s 
ideal point such that it lies within the discretion band around their ideal point, the 
bureaucrat will set the outcome policy to their ideal point (𝐵). The third line shows that 




point, the bureaucrat will move policy to the left as much as its effective discretion 
allows. 
𝑥3 =
𝜔3 + 𝑆𝑄 + 𝑑𝑎345			𝑖𝑓	𝑙 ≤ 𝜔3 < 𝐵 − 𝑆𝑄 − 𝑑𝑎345
𝐵			𝑖𝑓	𝐵 − 𝑆𝑄 − 𝑑𝑎345 ≤ 𝜔3 ≤ 𝐵 − 𝑆𝑄 + 𝑑𝑎345





The model relies on a fairly standard Nash equilibrium solution concept. Utilities 
and preferences for each actor are common knowledge, so the goal is to produce a 
solution that is a best response for each actor in the model. Since the timing of the game 
is well structured and common knowledge, the Legislator will choose a best response 
function that maximizes their utility first, which involves setting the optimal level of 
discretionary authority, d*. After this, the Bureaucrat will choose a best response function 
that maximizes their utility subject to d=d*, i.e., that the Legislator has chosen a best 
response. In this way, both actors are responding to each other with their respective best 
response functions, creating a standard Nash Equilibrium. Using backward induction to 
solve for the best response functions, the last move of the game is the bureaucrat’s 
decision to set the policy at the time of implementation. Knowing that the bureaucrat’s 
decision is analogous to Equation 3, the legislature will set an optimal Status Quo (𝑆𝑄∗) 
and d 𝑑∗  to maximize their expected utility on the move prior. This can be modeled by 
evaluating the legislator’s utility function for each of the separate outcomes at each of the 




Integrating over these separate evaluations yields the total expected utility for the 



















Step 1: Explicitly evaluate the integrals by substituting the interval endpoints for 𝜔 in the 
antiderivative of the legislature’s utility function. This allows for the evaluation of each 



















	 5 	  
 
Step 2: Factor out and cancel the constants. Equation 5 gives the total utility for each 
possible policy outcome over the interval where that outcome is possible; by summing 
over these distinct possibilities, I obtain the total utility for the Legislator over the policy 
space (from l to r). 
= −
1
2 1 − 𝛿
𝐵E − 𝑙 + 𝑆𝑄 + 𝑑𝑎 E + 6𝐵<𝑑𝑎 + 𝑟 + 𝑆𝑄 − 𝑑𝑎 E − 𝐵E 6 	 
 
Step 3: Simplify. Equation 6 represents the full evaluation of the Legislator’s utility 
function, but it is analytically complex. However, by distributing the multiplicative term 
and canceling out the B3 terms, I obtain a slightly simpler equation for the evaluation of 





𝑟 + 𝑆𝑄 − 𝑑𝑎 E − 𝑙 + 𝑆𝑄 + 𝑑𝑎 E + 6𝐵<𝑑𝑎
2 1 − 𝛿
	 7 	 
 
Step 4: Expand the cubic expressions. Equation 7 is still too complex for straightforward 
evaluation of how the Legislator’s utility changes with respect to the level of discretion 
they can set. To move forward, the cubic expressions are expanded to better isolate each 
term in the equation. 
= <(^_)
c4Ea ^_ L[E` ^_ L[EaL^_[ga\]^_[g\]L^_[E`L^_[g`\]^_4gAL^_[`c[E`L\][E`\]L4ac4EaL\]4Ea\]L
< 54M
	 8 	  
 
Equation 8 is the final form of the Legislator’s utility function evaluated over the 
entirety of the policy space (l,r); however, given the complexity, this equation is 
analytically intractable. To obtain a more analytically manageable equilibrium outcome 
some additional assumptions are necessary. The current model assumes that the endpoints 
of the shock interval, [𝑙, 𝑟], only relate to each other in that 𝑙 < 𝑟. However, under the 
assumption, as in Epstein and O’Halloran, that the shock interval is symmetric about the 
legislature’s ideal point, then the interval on which shocks exist becomes [−𝑅, 𝑅], where 
I have substituted −𝑅	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑙 and 𝑅	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑟. This results in Equation 9. 
𝐸𝑈? =
𝑑𝑎 E − 3𝑅 𝑑𝑎 < + 3𝑅<𝑑𝑎 + 3𝑆𝑄<𝑑𝑎 − 3𝐵<𝑑𝑎 + 𝑅E + 3𝑅𝑆𝑄<
1 − 𝛿
	 9 		 
 
From here, I explicitly evaluate the values of SQ and d that maximize the legislator’s 










which results in 𝑆𝑄∗ = 0. Practically, this means that the Legislator sets the existing 
policy to be their ideal point. 
 
The next step is to solve the optimization problem for the legislator’s expected utility 
function with respect to d, which will provide two critical points for potential values of 






3𝑎E𝑑< − 6𝑅𝑎<𝑑 + 3𝑅<𝑎 − 3𝐵<𝑎
1 − 𝛿
= 0	 11 		 
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Equation 11 shows that there are two potential solutions for the discretion level, d, that 
would optimize the legislator’s expected utility function. Determining which value in 
Equation 11 maximizes the Legislator’s expected utility requires a second derivative test 
to determine which value of d has a negative second derivative value, as this will be the 
value of d that maximizes the expected utility function, or d*. The second derivative test 










6𝑎<(𝑎 𝑅 + 𝐵𝑎 − 𝑅)
1 − 𝛿
,












The model considers the situation where the Bureaucrat is more conservative than the 
Legislator. Since the Legislator’s ideal point is fixed at 0, the Bureaucrat’s ideal point, B, 
must be to the right of the Legislator’s ideal point, or B > 0. Likewise, 𝛿 is a discount 
factor bounded on the interval (0,1). This means that all the variables in the second 
derivative are positive, so the only mathematically valid solution for the maximum, i.e. 
where the second derivative is negative, is O4A
_
. Thus the value of d that maximizes the 
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Discussion 
The results of the above model indicate that algorithmic interventions in the 
policy process produce new insights that change our understanding of bureaucratic 
delegation. I will discuss several analytic conclusions drawing from the results of 
Equation 12: 1) the equilibrium discretion outcome delegated by the legislature at the 
margins, i.e., the endpoints of algorithmic constraints; 2) the positive relationship 
                                                
32 Equation 12 also indicates that the effective discretion level, d*a, does not exceed the bounds of the 





between bureaucratic capacity and algorithms, and 3) the inverse relationship between 
algorithmic constraint and discretionary authority.  
The initial finding concerns the equilibrium level of discretionary authority at the 
margins of the output of a constraining algorithm. Given that 𝑎 ∈ (0,1]33, a value of 1 
indicates that there is no algorithmic constraint, while a value of 0 indicates that there is 
no human discretion. Analytically, a value of 0 would be the result when the algorithm 
has complete authority, which would functionally, if not actually, mean that the policy 
area was completely automated. We can consider the case when 𝑎 = 0, by explicitly 









= 0	 13  
Since d is no longer an explicit term in the optimization problem, the partial derivative 
reduces to 0. This yields the equality 0 = 0. Analytically, this indicates that there is no 
value of d which does not satisfy the optimization condition. In other words, the 
Legislator is comfortable giving a Bureaucrat any level of discretion if the algorithm is 
                                                
33 As discussed in footnote 28, d, the level of bureaucratic discretion also exists on a strictly positive 
interval. It can minimally take on the value of 0, where the Legislator does not delegate any authority to the 
Bureaucrat. In principal, the upper limit of d is unbounded: the Legislator can delegate as much authority to 
move policy outcomes as they wish; however, within the confines of the model, and practically speaking, a 
Bureaucrat would only exercise as much discretion as necessary to move a policy to their ideal point. At 
maximum, this would require enough discretion for a Bureaucrat whose ideal point was at one end of the 
policy shock space, say –R, to be able to move the final outcome policy to that ideal point from the 
opposite end of the shock space, R. This yields a maximal value of 2R. However, the practical amount of 
discretionary authority utilized by the Bureaucrat is not reflected by just d, but is also impacted by a, the 
algorithmic constraint. This results in a final, effective discretionary authority level being bounded on the 




functionally autonomously setting the final policy. This makes a certain amount of sense, 
since in an autonomous setting, bureaucratic discretion is moot, so there is no level of 
discretion which would change how the Legislator views the situation.34 
The results when 𝑎 = 1 are slightly more interesting because they are functionally 
equivalent to the equilibrium discretion level in the Epstein and O’Halloran model 𝑑∗ =
𝑅 − 𝑃, where P is the ideal point of the President. This validates the model in part, since 
an algorithmic constraint value of 1 means that the algorithm is allowing the bureaucrat 
to exercise complete discretionary authority, making the algorithm essentially non-
existent for that period. Thus, when the algorithm is not playing a role, the results of the 
model are the same as a model without an algorithmic constraint. This emphasizes the 
need to understand if claims of a suboptimal performance by an algorithmic decision aid 
is because of the decision system itself or if it because it is not being used. 
There is an additional, and in this instance somewhat unexpected, finding that can 
be derived by comparing the model’s equilibrium discretionary outcome to that obtained 
by the original model. Since 𝑎 ∈ (0,1], for all instances 𝑎 ≠ 1, the utility for the 
legislature adopting an algorithmic constraint policy is at least as high as a policy under 
which no algorithmic constraint is adopted. For a fixed level of utility to a legislature, 
comparing two policy schemes, one with an algorithmic constraint and one without, the 
                                                
34 A close reading of the model shows that the algorithm does not have any ability to unilaterally alter 
policy outcomes; by constraining the Bureaucrat to not exercise any discretion, the outcome policy cannot 
be altered after the policy shock is observed. Within the confines of the model, this is preferable to the 
Legislator if the policy shock consistently pushes the policy to a value between the Legislator’s and the 
Bureaucrat’s ideal point, i.e. when the Bureaucrat would consistently utilize their discretion to move policy 




legislator would be more willing to extend discretionary authority, in equilibrium, when 
an algorithmic constraint is part of the policy. Functionally, under the assumption that 
increases in discretionary authority are analogous to increases in bureaucratic capacity 
(i.e., to move policy to a larger degree, a bureaucratic agency must have more capacity, 
resources, expertise, etc. to utilize the full extent of its discretionary authority) then 
including an algorithmic constraint should increase bureaucratic capacity, in equilibrium. 
Huber and McCarty (2004) argue that if policymakers believe an agency will not be able 
to accurately execute a policy, for any reason including insubstantial resources, they are 
likely to recoil pursuing or supporting legislation in this area. 
Finally, the model suggests that legislators may hamper bureaucrats’ ability to 
respond to shocks in contexts where algorithmic aids poorly understand the nature of the 
exogenous shock35, such as in situations marked by high complexity, or low data quality. 
This can be seen by taking the partial derivative of the equilibrium discretion level with 





.	Since R is the upper bound of the 
realized shock space, and B is constrained to be strictly less than R, the quantity 𝐵 − 𝑅 is 
strictly negative, while 𝑎<will always be a positive value, making the partial derivative 
                                                
35	The nature of the relation between the underlying exogenous shock generation process and the 
algorithmic constraint output is not explicitly defined here. But for the purposes of the discussion, the 
algorithm fundamentally tries to predict a specific t	|	t-1. Where the prior distribution of t is well defined, 
understood, and predictable, the algorithm will produce a more confident estimate of t. The distance of this 
t from the status quo policy and the confidence of the algorithm in this estimate jointly determine the 
algorithmic constraint parameter. To the extent that the algorithm is consistently not confident in its 
estimates of t, then regardless of the distance of the estimate from the status quo, the algorithm will return 




monotonically negative. Thus, any increase in the algorithmic constraint parameter, 𝑎, is 
associated with decreases in the discretionary authority 𝑑. As a result, higher values of 𝑎, 
where the algorithm only slightly constrains the bureaucrat, are associated with smaller 
levels of bureaucratic discretion. Since the algorithm does not increase bureaucratic 
discretion, it only constrains it, adopting a policy that limits authority relative to an 
algorithm that would more reliably constrain the bureaucrat, only leaves the agency less 
able to deal with extreme shocks, albeit with full, if diminished, discretionary authority. 
These situations may arise in various governmental environments due to the many 
multifaceted social issues that have been difficult to understand or quantify. This could 
also occur in contexts that just do not have enough data to accurately predict or adjust 
outcomes for exogenous shocks; this could occur for several reasons. For example, 
predictive algorithms cannot learn from data that is not collected, for regulatory or 
political purposes; researchers may not have a thorough understanding of the relevant 
inputs to train algorithms on, or policy areas may be described by rare events and are 
correspondingly difficult to interpret accurately or predict.  
Each of these findings provides reasons to reevaluate our understanding and 
expectations of bureaucratic delegation processes under the addition of algorithmic aids. 
Given the fact that algorithms, machine learning, and AI are being readily adopted in 
areas well beyond bureaucratic delegation, we must learn to appropriately situate this 






 The model and results presented in this chapter provides a clear rationale for why 
policymakers may be drawn to including an algorithmic decision system in a piece of 
legislation. Legislators are plagued by a consistent problem when faced with the choice 
of delegating authority to a bureaucrat. On the one hand, legislators do not have as much 
relevant subject matter expertise as a bureaucratic agent, making them less able to 
respond to on the ground conditions and shocks. But, extending the bureaucrat more 
discretion may allow them to pull the ultimate realized policy outcome away from the 
legislators ideal point and towards the bureaucrat. This principal-agent problem is at the 
core of delegatory interactions between legislators and bureaucrats.  
 
Contributions and Novel Insights 
By dynamically constraining bureaucrats’ level of discretion based on contextual 
factors, ADSs offer legislators a partial solution. In instances where contexts are rapidly 
changing or that are subject to sudden shocks, for example financial market regulation or 
disaster response management, algorithmic policies promise to give bureaucrats full 
discretion when they need it, and constrained discretion when they do not, which in turn 
allows legislators to grant wider maximum discretion than they otherwise would. From 
the legislator's point of view the promise of an ADS is to provide the necessary level of 
discretion when needed, but to otherwise constrain the ability of a bureaucrat to shift a 




 Of course, the lived reality of ADS usage may differ significantly. The 
performance, ability to constrain, and responsiveness of these systems are highly 
dependent on the actual context, including computational, design, and political contexts. 
However, the main point here is that ADSs, as a policy tool, offer potential systemic 
advantages, in theory, over similar policy tools. A legislator simultaneously concerned 
with granting wide latitude to a bureaucrat resulting in bureaucratic drift but also with 
overly constraining a bureaucrat and thus decreasing their ability to integrate useful 
information or respond to a shock sees a ready answer in ADSs: let the algorithm handle 
it. 
 The conceptual framework laid out by the model establishes the fundamental 
political process impacts that algorithmic policies can have. Further than that though, by 
analogizing ADSs to the situation of bureaucratic politics, I demonstrate how well such 
systems fit into the broader research program concerned with bureaucracy, providing 
evidence for the discussion in Chapter 2 of ADSs as a natural evolution of bureaucratic 
capacity and practice. By arguing that ADSs are fundamentally of a kind with broader 
bureaucratic policy tools and concerns, I also further the argument that ADSs are 
distinctly and deeply political phenomena that should be analyzed with the tools and 







Future Research and Empirical Tests 
 As a concluding note, while an empirical evaluation of the formal model derived 
here is beyond the scope of this project, it is still useful to discuss ways the model may be 
evaluated empirically. Given the central contention that the model provides support for 
the notion that ADSs have structural advantages over similar policy tools, the findings 
here could be tested by examining empirical evidence for the robustness of such policy 
designs. Specifically, legislation that includes ADSs should be more likely to be 
reintroduced in subsequent sessions of a legislature, if they provide such systemic 
advantages. To the extent that ADSs are primed to propagate through policy areas, then 
the introduction of an ADS in one policy area should be associated with a higher 
likelihood of introduction in another policy area in a subsequent session of a legislature. 
In this way, ADSs may have diffusion effects that can be empirically observed. These 
empirical extensions are not the focus here; instead, the next chapter utilizes an empirical 
analysis to test for a different potential systemic benefit of ADSs than is tested by the 
model here: coalitional benefits for legislation that includes algorithmic policies. 
However, the empirical analysis is also concerned with understanding how the critical 
turn and resultant backlash phenomena, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, may mitigate 
potential systemic advantages. In this way, the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 offers a 
more complete discussion of the main themes and goals of the dissertation than is 
discussed here: ADSs as political artifacts that have fundamental process impacts but that 






Pretrial Risk Assessments and Criminal Justice Reform 
 
Decision aids, in this case, pretrial risk assessments,36 substantially increased in 
the 2000s and early 2010s, though after a recent backlash, have become much more 
politically fraught. Pretrial risk assessments, as a type of algorithmic decision system, 
represent one of the most fruitful instances of ADSs to test for potential systemic 
advantages and political process impacts, as well as to gauge how such potential 
advantages are moderated by backlash effects. This is due to the fact that pretrial risk 
assessments are one of the most visible forms of ADSs. Pretrial risk assessments have 
formed the focal point of many analyses, both popular and scholarly, that focus on the 
use of algorithmic policies. Pretrial risk assessments also represent one of the first, and 
most sustained, areas to be the focus of the critical turn and eventual backlash against 
ADSs. As such, this area represents one of the most promising policy tools to be able to 
test how ADSs might influence legislative processes, as well as how a backlash might 
moderate such process impacts. To test if the inclusion of an algorithmic decision aid 
provides advantages during the legislative process, such as increased bipartisan support, 
this chapter analyzes pretrial reform legislation in all 50 states in 2018, and all pretrial 
legislation that passed in a state legislature between 2012-2017. This timeframe will also 
be used to examine whether the changing narrative around risk assessments has 
                                                
36 Decision aiding algorithms in the context of pretrial decision aids are referred to risk assessment 




corresponded with a decline in legislative support. This chapter will begin by discussing 
the pretrial process, reform efforts, and the adoption trends of pretrial risk assessments. 
The next section tests whether the inclusion of pretrial risk assessments in legislation 
results in structural advantages, such as increased bipartisan support, and whether or not 
this phenomenon changes over time. 
This chapter substantively advances all three primary goals of the dissertation. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide initial empirical evidence that ADSs, in the 
form of pretrial risk assessments, have potential systemic advantages, and by extension 
political process impacts, on the legislative process (as specifically tested in the area of 
state level criminal justice legislation). This analysis directly advances the goals to 
provide a more empirical basis for research on algorithms and society as well as to 
specifically identify process impacts. Moreover, by directly positioning inclusion of 
algorithmic components as an independent variable in an analysis centered distinctly 
political dependent variables such as bipartisan support for legislation, this analysis 
furthers the argument that ADSs are inherently political. Beyond that, however, by 
integrating the effects of a potential backlash against such systems, this analysis 
demonstrates that ADSs are not just political objects themselves, but are the locus of 








Case Selection: Pretrial Reform and Risk Assessment Algorithms 
Over 10 million people are arrested each year in the United States (Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 2017). After an arrest,37 a pretrial process begins in which a 
judge or court magistrate must decide whether or not a defendant should be detained prior 
to their trial. Pretrial release decisions are primarily based on two factors in most 
jurisdictions: flight risk (i.e., the likelihood of failing to appear at the trial) and risk the 
defendant poses to individuals or the community (Kehl, Guo, and Kessler 2017). Specific 
procedures and laws vary by jurisdiction, but generally, judges may choose to 1) release 
the defendant on their own recognizance,38 2) release the defendant with conditions,39 3) 
set a monetary bail amount that the defendant must pay the court in order to be released 
and will forfeit if they fail to appear, or 4) detain the defendant without bail40 (Feeley 
2017).  
The primary considerations for whether or not to release a defendant (and if so, on 
what conditions) tends to be the severity of the accused crime and the defendant’s 
criminal background; however, judicial discretion enables judges and magistrates to 
consider other factors and contexts. These factors may be explicitly taken into 
consideration or they may implicitly contribute to a judge’s intuition about a case 
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007). Research indicates that judges’ assessments 
                                                
37 While most procedures vary to some extent by jurisdiction, this is typically the process that occurs after 
an arrest or after a defendant turns them self into police following a warrant being issued. If a crime is 
reported, but officials chose not to issue a warrant, a summons is issued calling for the defendant to appear 
in court for either a pretrial appearance (at which this process begins) or at the trial.  
38 Release on recognizance only requires the defendant to sign a document stating they will return for their 
trial. 
39 Release conditions vary, but can include requirements like abstaining from drugs or alcohol. 




may include extralegal factors. For instance, a judge’s may be influenced  by their 
perception of the defendant’s sociodemographic profile, such as the defendant’s race, 
gender, or income. Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018) find substantial bias against black 
defendants. Specifically, the authors find that judges, particularly less experienced 
judges, tend to set higher bail requirements for black defendants than for white 
defendants with similar crimes and criminal background. They argue this result likely 
stems from implicit biased regarding risks rather than explicit racial animosity. 
Defendants of lower economic status also face significant disadvantages, as well as 
institutional inequalities, such as having a public defense, rather than private counsel. 
Typically, public defense attorneys do not get to speak with their client until later in the 
process and often have more cases and fewer resources than private defense. Hissong and 
Wheeler (2017) find that bail tends to be at least 25% lower for defendants with private 
counsel. Furthermore, the authors find that 90% of the defendants with private counsel 
were able to post bail, in contrast to only 27% of those without private counsel.  
 Monetary bail compounds these biases because it is a fundamentally economically 
biased tool. Defendants are often given a bail amount that they must pay in order to be 
released and must forfeit the payment if they do not return for their trial (in addition to 
having a warrant issued for their arrest) (Rabuy and Kopf 2016). If a defendant cannot 
pay their bail in full, they may use a bail bond service. Bond agents typically require the 
defendant to pay 10% of the bail upfront, which will act as payment for the service and 
will not be returned. Additionally, most bail bond agencies require the defendant (or 




deposit or may be required to sign over collateral for the full bail amount (Williams 2017, 
Hopkins and Doyle 2018). Bail is often set upwards of several thousand dollars, even for 
misdemeanor crimes, and many defendants are not able to afford the 10% fee or do not 
own anything worth the needed amount of collateral (Natapoff 2011, Sacks and 
Ackerman 2012).Wealthy individuals are able to purchase their freedom, often regardless 
of how high bail is set. For instance, despite the severity of his accused crimes, Harvey 
Weinstein was able to post a $1 million bond within only hours of his arrest (Kozlowska 
2018). This is in stark contrast to more than 500,000 defendants currently being detained 
because they could not afford their bail amount (Rabuy and Kopf 2016).  
 
Implications of Pretrial Detention 
The negative implications of pretrial detention begin immediately and have 
lasting consequences. First, those who are detained prior to their trial are significantly 
more likely to be convicted and to serve a longer sentence compared to those who were 
released prior to their trial. For example, Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson (2016) found 
that misdemeanor defendants who were detained were not only 25% more likely to plead 
guilty but also 43% more likely to receive jail time, which is, on average, twice the length 
of those who were granted a pretrial release. Being detained decreases the defendant’s 
ability to aid their defense in building a case for their release. For instance, the defendant 
is only permitted a small amount of time for calls and visits that must be also be used to 
talk with family. Detained defendants are also unable to visit the scene of the accused 




and Wilkerson 2018). Similarly, due to the harsh conditions of imprisonment, as well as 
the outside consequences of being detained, such as the loss of housing or employment, 
the defendant may be incentivized to plead guilty to speed up the eventual release. This 
worsens the already asymmetric power dynamics during plea negotiations, leading 
detained defendants to plead guilty regardless of guilt (Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang 2018).  
A criminal record, even for a misdemeanor, can have life-altering consequences 
after the defendant’s release. These include heavy fines, deportation, loss of housing, loss 
of employment, and loss of child custody, to name only a few (Heaton, Mayson, and 
Stevenson 2016). Convictions can also have downstream ramifications, such as 
limitations on future educational, employment, and social opportunities (Natapoff 2011). 
This also has the consequence of substantially lowering the defendant’s lifetime income 
and, when considered with the hundreds of thousands of individuals who are or have 
been imprisoned, also ultimately decreases tax revenue (Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang 
2018). In addition to this loss in future revenue, the government also spends an estimated 
13.6 billion dollars on pretrial incarceration (Rabuy 2017).  
 
Pretrial Risk Assessments 
The costs of pretrial detention to individuals, communities, and the state as well 
as evidence of unjust and biased judicial decisions, have led to significant criminal justice 
reform efforts, many of which include the reform or abolition of monetary bail. 
Generally, pretrial detainment decisions often go beyond simply analyzing and 




future events (e.g., whether if released, the defendant will fail to return to court or if they 
will be a danger to others). Because it cannot be known what will happen, the judge must 
extrapolate (Singh & Fazel 2010; Mayson 2019). Furthermore, judges typically have 
incomplete information available, which they may prioritize or deprioritize based on the 
factors they deem necessary or most important. The decision of whether or not to detain a 
defendant, release them on bail (and if so, how much), or on their own recognizance is 
largely decided based on intuition or other subjective, implicit calculations and fallible 
cognitive processes (DeMichele et al. 2018). 
In contrast, decision aiding software has been seen as a way to provide judges 
with information based strictly on statistical probabilities of risk which have been 
determined through analysis of prior cases. These tools use a defendant’s information, 
which vary but can include socioeconomic indicators, information about the current case 
and previous criminal history. These systems calculate a risk score and/or 
recommendation to help judges assess the likelihood of certain behaviors, usually related 
to either risks the defendant poses (flight risks, risk of future violence, etc.) or needs they 
may require (such as addiction or mental health services) (Desmarais and Lowder 2019). 
The aim of pretrial risk assessment instruments is to influence or “guide” judges to 
ground release decisions in more objective and predictive factors than either the charge 
alone or information gleaned from brief interviews or legally fraught or protected 
characteristics (e.g., race, gender, appearance, mannerisms, etc.). DeMichele et al. (2017) 
argue that risk assessment systems allow judges to review and override their initial 




behavioral economists that assert that individuals can be “nudged” into making better 
decisions. This “libertarian paternalism” holds that individuals ultimately retain 
discretion, but institutions can shape environmental factors to influence decisions in a 
way that systematically guide individuals to make decisions that produce more socially 
beneficial outcomes without mandating that behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
Risk assessment instruments take a set of inputs often including demographic 
factors, current charge(s), and criminal history, employment status, residence, community 
ties, and drug use (Hannah-Moffat 2015, Kennealy 2018). Some assessment algorithms 
also include information derived from a personal interview or survey, including questions 
such as “[h]ow many of your friends/acquaintances are taking drugs illegally?” and “[a] 
hungry person has a right to steal” (Angwin et al. 2016). These data are then used to 
produce one or more risk scores, often on a numerical scale (i.e., scores of 1-10) or a 
classification scale (i.e., scores of “low, moderate, or high” risk). The majority of these 
tools have proprietary processes. For instance based on Northpointe’s public disclosure, 
we know that “COMPAS is an algorithm that analyzes a number of demographic, social, 
and physiological factors in a publicly unknown way (its underlying processes and 
weights are proprietary information) to derive an estimate for how much of a ‘risk’ an 
arrestee is for fleeing from their court date or committing a new crime if released on bail” 
and that “it consists of predictive risk scales for risk prediction” (4-5). Various risk 






Adoption and implementation of pretrial risk assessment tools. 
Various risk assessment frameworks have been used in the criminal justice system 
off and on since the 1920s. These processes and tools were often intended to predict 
criminality, but the manner in which they do this has varied over the years. The first 
approaches to assessing the risks posed by a defendant occurred in the 1920s (Harcourt 
2008). This was an unstructured approach that encouraging a professional assessment by 
a clinician to assess criminality using factors like “the look in a prisoner’s eye” (Solow-
Niederman, Choi, and Van den Broeck 2019; also see Rothman 2017). The subjective 
nature of this approach drew criticism and, by the 1960s, spurred the creation of more 
structured tools, such as the Vera Institute’s Manhattan Bail Project risk assessment, that 
produced simplistic scores based on a small list of factors. Various other risk assessments 
were deployed throughout the years, though few that were empirically validated or used 
beyond one state or county (Lowenkamp, Lemke, and Latessa 2008). More rigorous 
statistical and computational risk assessment tools, including those using machine 
learning techniques, began in the early 2000s in various states and jurisdictions, including 
Virginia and Washington D.C.. By 2009, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
recommended the development of an actuarial pretrial risk assessment for federal courts. 
The “Pretrial Risk Assessment” (PTRA) was implemented nationally in 2011 (Cadigan 
and Lowenkamp 2011).  
Pretrial risk assessment tools are much more varied on the state level, with some 
mirroring the PTRA, while other states have purchased algorithmic tools from private or 




due to vastly less stringent technology procurement regulations on the state level, which 
gives the state and local jurisdictions much more flexibility to request and procure 
technology (Brown 2014). There is also the practical need to design new risk assessment 
in order to appropriately analyze local populations that may have unique differences 
compared to other localities (Latessa et al. 2010, Werth 2019). Similarly, models may 
need to be reformulated based on each jurisdictions’ laws.  
The manner in which PRAs are mandated with legislation also varies. For 
instance, The New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act of 2017 explicitly adopted the 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s41 risk assessment, the Pretrial Safety Assessment 
(PSA). This has been one of the most widely adopted risk assessment tools, which as of 
2017, had been adopted by about 40 jurisdictions nationwide. Some of these jurisdictions 
have adopted the PSA as part of state-wide implementation, like New Jersey, while some 
counties have independently chosen to adopt the algorithm (ACLU New Jersey, 2017). In 
contrast, the California Money Bail Reform Act of 2018 required a varied approach in 
which California courts could use any “validated risk assessment… from the list of 
approved pretrial risk assessment tools maintained by the Judicial Council” (CA SB 10, 




                                                
41 The Laura and John Arnold Foundation transitioned from a 501 C3 Foundation to a Limited Liability 




The Decline of Pretrial Risk Assessment Support 
The early 2000s saw a generally optimistic narrative about the way technology 
would change the world with refrains in conferences and classroom about “technology 
for the social good” (Cohen 2018). However, by the mid 2010s, there was growing 
concern over the ethical implications of many emerging technologies among journalists, 
academics, and policymakers. In May 2016, ProPublica, an investigative news 
organization, broke a story entitled “Machine Bias,” which asserted that “[t]here’s 
software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against 
blacks” (Angwin et al. 2016). This article found that people of color were twice as likely 
to be given high-risk assessment scores despite, on average, being significantly less likely 
to commit future crimes than their white peers. In doing so, ProPublica helped bring these 
issues to the broader public and launch dozens of studies, reports, and research institutes 
and initiatives on risk assessment algorithms, particularly those that are used in the 
criminal justice system. (Courtland 2018; Solow-Niederman, Choi, and Van den Broeck 
2019 ).  
 Any tool or process added to the current US criminal justice system is inherently 
ripe for criticism. The criminal justice system has been shaped by racial animosity and 
disregard, or even malfeasance, toward the poor and working class, and because 
predictive decision systems rely on historical data to find pertinent trends and patterns 
that can be used as indicators in new cases, these biases are deeply entrenched in crime 
data and statistics (Lum et al. 2014, Rabuy and Kopf 2016, Middlemass 2018). As such, 




garbage out” argument, though it tends to be oriented around personal or systematic 
errors stemming from prejudice or discrimination, or as Mayson (2019) describes it, 
“Bias In, Bias Out”. 
Due to the current injustices and inequalities in policing and the legal system, any 
proposed remedy will still interact with many varied layers of bias. This is not to say that 
algorithmic risk assessments cannot provide marginal improvement to a highly flawed 
system. For instance, a risk assessment algorithm implemented in Virginia in 2004, the 
first to be used for non-violent offenses, was found to dramatically decrease the rise in 
nonviolent incarceration rates. Within the first decade of use, incarceration rates were 
only increasing by about 5%, down from the 31% growth prior to the tool’s 
implementation (Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission 2014). However, even the 
most accurate tools will be a part of a flawed system, and thus open to criticism regarding 
their contribution to harmful systemic outcomes. Virginia’s incarceration rate is not 
growing as rapidly, but it is still continuously growing. As Human Rights Watch notes: 
“Profile based risk assessment, even if it could be made less biased, less 
arbitrary and more transparent, remains a tool to efficiently process cases, 
which allows the criminal justice system to continue its current pattern of 
over-criminalization.” (2017, p. 4) 
 
 Opponents argue that pretrial risk assessments only provide legitimacy to an 
unjust system and potentially stymie more meaningful reforms (Human Rights Watch 
2017). Generally, critiques of algorithmic risk assessments are inextricably tied to 
broader systemic and institutional problems within the criminal justice system. the system 




tool, are tangled within broader, systemic concerns. This narrative has caused a backlash 
against pretrial risk assessments and have even resulted in criminal justice reform bills 
being challenged or revoked in the face of wide-spread criticism (Solow-Niederman, 
Choi, and Van den Broeck 2019).  
The focus on pretrial risk assessments make related legislation (i.e., legislation 
that includes an algorithmic risk assessment) an ideal case study to analyze the effects of 
both positive and negative narratives on bipartisan support and bill passage. However, 
given the unique lifecycle of this specific kind of decision aiding system, the trends 
discussed within this chapter are not necessarily representative of trends of other 
Algorithmic Decision Systems, such as the systems used to determine welfare eligibility 
and benefits. That said, information gleaned from risk assessments in the criminal justice 
system may provide insight regarding the effects of a tool becoming more scrutinized or 
politicized (see Whittaker et al. 2018). 
 
Data and Methodology 
The discussion above illustrates both the incentives and political pressure for 
pretrial risk assessments and the backlash arising from the use and misuse of risk 
assessment systems within criminal justice. T, so building on the idea that ADSs, like 
ADSs, may be perceived as being advantageous  to policymakers (as illustrated in 
Chapter 3), this Chapter seeks to 1) explore initial empirical evidence regarding 
legislative support for ADSs and 2) whether changes in public perception of these 




Pretrial Risk Assessments, I develop several tests for these issues below. The next section 
will discuss the data sources and collection methods used within my analysis, as well as 
detail my methodological approach. This will be followed by a section that discusses the 
results from the analysis and their implications. Lastly, I will briefly outline directions for 
future research. 
 
Data Sources and Collection 
The preceding discussion and the discussion in Chapter 2 yield two general types 
of hypotheses concerning the impact of risk assessments on criminal justice legislation. 
From Chapter 2, one of the main impacts of algorithmic policy interventions is to create 
larger and more diverse legislative coalitions in support of bills that contain algorithms. 
This is due to the uncertainty that surrounds the actual outcomes from the use of 
algorithms coupled with the ‘objectivity’ framing that surrounds the use of such tools. 
Ideologically motivated legislators are likely to believe that the ‘objective’ truth 
generated by an algorithmic process will more likely match their preferred outcomes; this 
in turn helps increase the ‘win set’ of potential agreements between ideologically diverse 
veto point holders, i.e., legislators with different outcome preferences will be willing to 
agree on the same policy with the inclusion of an algorithm under the belief that the 
algorithm will produce outcomes more in line with their preferences. Risk assessments, 
as a type of algorithm, should benefit from this baseline benefit in coalition building. This 




count of co-authors on a piece of legislation, and eventual enactment of legislation, under 
the assumption that the prior coalitional benefits aids in the passage of legislation. 
However, the prior discussion in this chapter indicates that over time, a substantial 
backlash has built against the use of risk assessment algorithms in criminal justice 
legislation. This indicates that the baseline coalitional benefits from risk assessments 
should erode in more recent years, possibly resulting in overall negative effects from 
inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm. Testing this notion requires the use of data with 
some type of time component, to gain traction on how the relationship between 
algorithms and the dependent variables of interest (bipartisan support, co-author count, 
and eventual enactment) has changed over time. This results in two general classes of 
hypotheses for evaluation: one that focuses on the baseline effects of inclusion of an 
algorithm component and a second that focuses on how the effects of algorithmic policy 
inclusion changes over time. 
Fortunately, the National Conference of State Legislatures has collected records 
of state-level criminal justice legislation in two separate databases that can be used to 
evaluate these classes of hypotheses. One covers criminal justice legislation passed in 
each state legislature for each year between 2012 and 2017. These data allow for the 
evaluation of both the baseline effects and the time dependent effects of algorithmic 
policy inclusion, but only on legislation that successfully passed through a state 
legislature. This has two drawbacks, 1) the impact of algorithmic inclusion on actual 
passage of legislation cannot be observed with these data, only generally coalitional 




inclusion on legislation that was ultimately passed; it does not provide a full accounting 
of information at the beginning of the introduction state for a piece of legislation. The 
second database contains information on criminal justice legislation introduced on the 
state level for 2018. These data allow for the explicit evaluation of the relationship 
between inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm and eventual policy enactment, in 
addition to the coalitional effects, as well as providing insight earlier in the policy making 
process by including legislation that was introduced but ultimately failed. However, these 
data do not allow for the evaluation of time dependent effects, and given that it only 
covers the most recent year, i.e., where the backlash effect is likely strongest, the baseline 
effect for inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm is likely to be at its smallest, or 
potentially its most negative, value. 
Data were collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures’ (NCSL) 
database containing enacted pretrial policy legislation from 2012-2017, and failed and 
enacted pretrial policy legislation in 2018. The database contains the following 
information: the policy name and number, the date of last action, a summary of the bill, 
bill authors and their respective political affiliations; and tags categorizing 12 policy 
areas relating to pretrial reforms. The policy categories include: Bond Forfeiture and 
Conditions Violations; Budget, Oversight, and Administration; Citation in Lieu of Arrest; 
Commercial Bond Regulation; Conditions of Pretrial Release; Court Guidance for 
Release Determinations; Diversion Programs; Eligibility for Pretrial Release; Pretrial 
Services and Programs; Risk Assessment; Specialized Populations; and Victim 




 The data from the NCSL covers the entirety of all successfully passed pretrial 
legislation in all U.S. states between 2012 and 2017 and the entirety of all introduced 
pretrial legislation in all U.S. states in 2018. In this sense, the datasets observed for the 
analysis are the population level data for the respective policy types. The primary goal of 
the analysis is to demonstrate the viability of observing algorithmic impacts on the 
legislative process through the lens of risk assessment tools and pretrial legislation. This 
is aided by having access to population data because it simplifies the statistics involved 
with such an analysis. The primary implication regards significance testing. Significance 
testing quantifies the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis due to sampling error; 
however, since the data are population level, there is no sampling involved for sampling 
error to be the reason for false inferential reasoning. Instead, the parameter estimates 
obtained by the statistical models provide the true population estimates because the data 
used is the true population data. 
However, many researchers still utilize significance testing even while working 
with population-level data under the rationale of super-populations. The idea of a super-
population is that any finite population of size N is actually a sample drawn from an 
infinite super population (Hartley & Sielken 1975). In this sense, the passed 2012-2017 
legislation and the introduced 2018 legislation are just realized samples from two broader 
super-populations of passed and introduced legislation. The super-population concept 
allows scholars to generalize their findings from the finite N population to the infinite 
super-population. This allows scholars to infer that relationships which likely exist in 




super population. This can be realized as a relationship in one policy area existing in 
another, similar policy area, each of which exist in the same policy area across time or 
jurisdictions. Scholars will therefore use significance testing on population data to 
increase the generalizability of any potential finding to contexts of temporal persistence 
or legislative cross-applicability. 
The tradeoff for this generalizability is decreased sensitivity, or the ability for the 
analysis to correctly identify true relations. By subjecting potential findings to 
significance tests, scholars run the risk or falsely accepting the null hypothesis on the 
basis of the relevant p-value failing to achieve the selected significance level for the 
analysis. In the normal pursuit of strong evidence for causal relationships, the risk of a 
type II error is acceptable in the face of making spurious causal claims. 
However, in the context of this specific inquiry into algorithmic interventions, and 
more specifically pretrial risk assessment algorithms, there is cause to interrogate the 
rationale and tradeoff of the super-population logic. In particular, there is reason to 
suspect that the loss in sensitivity is more costly and the gain in generalizability is smaller 
in the context of risk assessment algorithms. The goal of the empirics is not to make 
strong causal claims about the impact of risk assessment algorithms on the legislative 
process. Rather, the goal is to conduct an exploratory analysis to try to detect a 
relationship between inclusion of algorithmic policy components and various aspects of 
the legislative process. The literature on empirical evidence between algorithms and 
legislation is not particularly well developed, so the main goal is to call scholarly 




such impacts. In this sense, the risk of committing a type II error is a worse outcome in an 
exploratory analysis than in an analysis focused on building strong causal evidence. 
In addition to the issue of loss of sensitivity, there are also strong reasons to 
suspect that there is little to gain from generalizing any findings to a theoretical super-
population. Risk assessment algorithms were chosen for analysis given that they have a 
more significant legislative history than most other forms of algorithmic interventions. 
However, the increased instances of risk assessments in legislation also make them 
unique: risk assessment algorithms are more visible in the public and the media and they 
are subject to increased attention from various lobbying and interest groups. Algorithmic 
interventions are also a fairly new phenomenon, which means that legislators, lobbyists, 
and bureaucrats are learning how to write and implement laws that involve them. As a 
result, the super-population from which the observed population data are pulled from is 
likely to be highly context-dependent. As legislators learn more about how to effectively 
utilize algorithms, as public and media attention shifts on the subject, and as lobbying and 
interest group policy goals change, the super-population will also change. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the super-population will remain the same in different legislative contexts 
and locations, or even over the next few years. Only by continuing to examine the data 
over the coming years and in different contexts can scholars begin to build a notion as to 
the long term impacts of including algorithms in legislation. My analysis is a first step in 
that process, but as a first step, the tradeoff between sensitivity and generalizability is not 
the same here as in many other studies. Instead, this analysis will forgo statistical 




ability in detecting potential relationships in the data. Since the goal of the analysis is to 
demonstrate the viability of algorithmic impacts on policy making, the tradeoff in 
generalizability for explanatory power seems reasonable. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Discussion 
 The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine the potential for the inclusion of 
algorithmic components in legislation to meaningfully impact key points in the legislative 
process, specifically the co-authorship stage and bill passage. The discussion in Chapter 2 
on the potential impact of including algorithmic components in legislation focused not on 
enactment but on the potential of easing coalition building by blurring perceptions of a 
policy’s outcome and allowing both sides to believe they are getting what they want. In 
this sense, the most direct causal impact of including an algorithmic component in a piece 
of legislation is not enactment of the legislation but improvements in the number and 
diversity of legislator support.  
Prior research indicates that bipartisan support is likely to arise when either 
partisan differences over policy are small or when the uncertainty associated with the 
policy area is high (Epstein 1998). In the case of ADSs, as argued in Chapter 2, 
legislators are likely to believe their preferences will be achieved by an algorithmic 
component because of the vague narrative that the ADS will produce an “objective” 
outcome. This could produce the practical implication of there being little difference 
between partisan preferences, even though this is because each party may be 




believes they will get what they want. ADSs are also often employed in complex policy 
environments, which may also increase overall uncertainty. Furthermore, while 
polarization has increased overall in Congress, this pattern is much more likely to occur 
during the floor vote (Harbridge 2011). Thus, bipartisan co-authorship is a relevant 
indicator of support that is relatively outside of polarized and partisan influences. And 
while bipartisan support in the form of co-sponsorship may not necessarily result in 
enactment, it may contribute to the policy content having later legislative success. For 
instance, broader support may lead to continued reintroduction of the legislation in later 
legislative sessions or provide resiliency against future legislative changes. Contributions 
to success beyond each year’s session are beyond the scope of this project but should be 
considered in future research.  
 The total number of authors may also be indicative of support, though not 
necessarily bipartisan support. Sponsorship/co-sponsorship is a rare decision that is 
totally within the control of the legislator (Schiller 1995). It can also be a method to 
influence the agenda to include a particular issue or policy. Indeed, the more authors on a 
bill, the more likely it is to receive serious attention from party leadership, in part, 
because it signals that there are is widespread interest and support for the legislation and 
that it could be beneficial for many members (Krutz 2005, Bratton and Rouse 2011). Co-
sponsorship can also be a signal to other legislators who share goals or have similar 
constituencies that a bill is of relative importance in comparison to other policies vying 
for attention (Kingdon 1989, Zhang et al. 2008), potentially garnering further support 




legislator’s reputation as a proponent of the issue (Schiller 1995). This serves as another 
way to observe the extent of support for legislation that includes algorithmic decision 
systems even when that legislation is not enacted. 
  Enactment serves as a way to observe the effect of ADSs on policy outcomes 
relative to these other indicators of support. While bill-level attributes, such as multiple 
sponsors and bipartisan sponsorship, may contribute to eventual policy enactment, the 
many contextual variables that change based on the specific time period, legislators 
involved, and content of the bill complicate the relationship between these variables 
(Bratton and Rouse 2011). This makes enactment a measure of support beyond and, 
perhaps, significantly different from the support indicated during sponsorship activities. 
With this in mind, the following empirical analysis examines three main dependent 
variables of interest and one main independent variable of interest. 
 Each of the main variables of interest are represented on a bill-year basis: each 
bill in a specific year is evaluated for whether it meets the criteria for the relative 
variable. Bills are considered independent across different years, i.e., they are unrelated 
across year observations. Each variable was calculated from raw data obtained from 
scrapping the base HTML code from the NCSL pre-trial legislation database webpage. 
The python code used to parse and construct the dataset is reproduced in the appendix. 
 Algorithmic- The main IV of interest concerns the inclusion of an algorithmic 
component in a piece of legislation. The benefit of restricting the analysis to pretrial 
policy is two fold: 1) the nature of algorithmic policy tools in this space is well defined 




in the policy area allows for population level analysis. This variable is calculated based 
on the NCSL topic categorizations, specifically whether or not a piece of legislation was 
associated with the ‘Risk Assessment’ topic. This is a binary coded variable where 1 
represents the presence of a risk assessment algorithm tool in a piece of legislation. 
 Bipartisan- This dependent variable represents whether or not a specific bill has 
an author and at least one co-author from the two major parties, Democrat and 
Republican; independent legislators are not considered in this calculation. This is a binary 
coded variable where 1 represents a bill with bipartisan support among the authors and 
co-authors.  
 Total Authors- This dependent variable represents the total number of authors 
attached to a piece of legislation: author, Republican co-authors, and Democratic co-
authors; independent legislators are not considered in the analysis.  
 Enactment- This dependent variable represents whether or not a specific bill was 
enacted into law. This includes successful passage through both houses of the state 
legislature (or one in Nebraska), and a signature from the state executive. This is a binary 
coded variable where 1 represents successful enactment of a piece of legislation. The 
nature of the enactment variable changes meaning significantly between the 2012-2017 
data and the 2018 data. The bills represented in the 2012-2017 data are only the bills that 
successfully passed through the legislature in any given year in the dataset, i.e., the subset 
of 2012 data is comprised only of bills that passed the legislature in 2012, the subset of 
2013 data is comprised only of bills that passed the legislature in 2013, etc. Once a bill 




through an executive veto and a corresponding failure to override. In this sense, the 
enactment variable for the 2012-2017 data more accurately represents the inverse of a 
successful governor's veto, of which there were 32 (see Table 1).  
Figure 1: Number of Criminal Justice Legislation Containing Risk Assessment 
Components for Each Year 2012-2018 
 
 Figure 1 shows the distribution of algorithmic legislation across years in the 
various datasets. The counts of criminal justice legislation containing risk assessment 
algorithms are fairly stable for each year of the data set, with the exception of 2017, 
which saw almost double the number of algorithmic legislation as the next highest count 
year. The 2018 data is split between bills that were eventually enacted, which are more 




in the process (committee, floor vote, etc.). The only failures included in the 2012-2017 
data were bills that were successfully vetoed. There were over five times as many failed 
pieces of legislation as passed, but it is unknown how this compares to other years in the 
dataset as there is no information on the number of failed pieces of legislation for the 
other years in the dataset. 
Table 1: 2012-2017 Passed Pretrial Legislation Main Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Main Variables of 
Interest Algorithmic Enactment Bipartisan 
Total 
Authors 
N 676 676 676 676 
0 Values 626 32 578 0 
Min 0 0 0 1 
Max 1 1 1 88 
Sum 50 644 98 1898 
Median 0 1 0 1 
Mean 0.07 0.95 0.14 2.81 
Var 0.07 0.05 0.12 38.37 
Std.Dev 0.26 0.21 0.35 6.19 
 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest for all pieces 
of enacted pretrial legislation in state governments that were passed during legislative 
sessions from 2012-2017. Overall, 676 pieces of legislation were passed by state 
legislatures, with 644, or about 95% being signed into law by a governor. 50 of those 
bills, or roughly 7%, contained some component of a risk assessment tool. Each piece of 




Only 98 enacted pieces of pretrial legislation over this period, or 14%, had bipartisan 
support. 
 
Table 2: 2018 Introduced Legislation Main Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Main Variables of 
Interest Algorithmic Enactment Bipartisan 
Total 
Authors 
N 641 641 641 641 
0 Values 584 495 561 0 
Min 0 0 0 1 
Max 1 1 1 56 
Sum 57 146 80 2157 
Median 0 0 0 1 
Mean 0.09 0.23 0.12 3.37 
Var 0.08 0.18 0.11 38.14 
Std.Dev 0.28 0.42 0.33 6.18 
 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all introduced pretrial legislation in 
state legislatures in 2018. These data contrast with Table 1 in terms of time (2012-2017 
vs. 2018) and scope of included legislation (all passed vs. all introduced). Despite this, 
many of the findings are similar. The data for introduced legislation in 2018 have slightly 
higher representation of algorithmic policy tools, in the form of risk assessment 
algorithms (7% vs. 9%), are slightly less bipartisan (14% vs. 12%), and have on average 
more total authors associated with each bill (2.89 vs. 3.37), although most pieces of 
legislation still have a single author with no co-authors. The main difference between the 




reflect bills that had passed, with 95% eventually becoming enacted into law, while 2018 
contains the totality of pretrial legislation that was introduced in 2018, of which only 146, 
or 23%, were enacted into law. 
 The control variables used for the empirical analysis fall into one of two distinct 
groupings. Political data and authorship data. Political data refer to the political context a 
bill was introduced or enacted. Unified control represents whether or not the state 
government as an entity (legislative and executive branches) was controlled by a single 
party or was under divided government, coded as 0 or 1, respectively. Democratic and 
Republican control denote whether either party had complete control over state 
government, both coded as 0 or 1, respectively. These three variables are closely related 
to each other. When either Democratic or Republican control is 1, then unified control is 
also 1. When unified control is 0, so too are Republican and Democratic control. 
Including all three measures in the empirical analysis allows for the separation of a 
specific partisan effect from only a unified government effect. More specifically, this 
allows the model to be sensitive to the difference between legislative styles of Republican 
majorities and Democratic majorities in the context of criminal justice legislation from 
the efficiency gains of different veto points being controlled by ideologically similar 
legislators. There is some concern for multicollinearity in any models given the highly 
related nature of these variables; however, the highest level of pairwise correlation is only 
0.74 (between Unified Control and Republican Control), which is not unduly indicative 




inefficient parameter estimates, but given that the analyses do not rely on testing for 
significance, this is less of an issue.  
The last political control variable, Party Type, represents the political position of 
the bill author’s party. This variable takes on the values of -1 for a bill authored by a 
minority party member in the context of unified control, 0 for any bill authored in a 
divided government context, and 1 for a bill authored by a majority party member in the 
context of unified control. In this sense, party type is an ordinal variable representing the 
degree of control of the bill author’s party. There are likely other relevant political 
controls that could be included in the models, but the analysis is restricted to these for 
two primary reasons. The first is feasibility: additional data on the political context of 
each state’s legislative session for each year would represent a significant resource 
investment for what would likely be marginal gains in model performance. The second is 
scope: the goal of the analysis is not to provide rigorous causal evidence for the impact of 
algorithmic policy tools on the legislative process, but rather to explore the potential for 
algorithmic impacts and demonstrate potential causal mechanisms and the need for more 
scholarly attention on collecting and evaluating empirical evidence on the impact of 
algorithms. In this sense, a well specified model with a complete accounting of relevant 
controls is less of a necessary requisite for the analysis than being able to provide for an 














Control Party Type 
N 676 676 676 676 
0 Values 233 343 566 81 
Min 0 0 0 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Sum 443 333 110 481 
Median 1 0 0 1 
Mean 0.66 0.49 0.16 0.71 
Var 0.23 0.25 0.14 0.37 
Std.Dev 0.48 0.5 0.37 0.61 
 
 Table 3 displays the distribution of political control attributes for the 2012-2017 
passed pretrial legislation. Most bills were passed under the context of unified 
government (66%) with almost half being passed under unified Republican control 
(333/676 or 49%), while only 16% 110/676) were passed under unified Democratic 
control. The median value for party control is 1, indicating that the majority of bills were 
passed by the majority party. This is true for 71% of pretrial bills passed during this 
period. This makes the modal bill a Republican authored bill passed during a legislative 














Control Party Type 
N 641 641 641 641 
0 Values 257 358 540 86 
Min 0 0 0 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Sum 384 283 101 347 
Median 1 0 0 1 
Mean 0.6 0.44 0.16 0.54 
Var 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.57 
Std.Dev 0.49 0.5 0.36 0.76 
 
 Table 4 shows descriptive data for all proposed pretrial state legislation in 2018. 
The numbers here are overall similar to the dataset for passed bills between 2012-2017. 
Most were passed under unified control, with most of those being characterized by 
Republican control, although the numbers here are slightly lower (60% vs 66% for 
unified control and 44% vs 49% for Republican control). The lower average value for 
Party Type of 0.56 (vs. 0.71 for 2012-2017 data) shows that the bills under consideration 
are more reflective of minority parties and parties under divided control, which would be 

















N 676 676 676 676 
0 Values 350 439 547 542 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 1 48 39 
Sum 326 237 554 664 
Median 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.48 0.35 0.82 0.98 
Var 0.25 0.23 12.63 10.94 
Std.Dev 0.5 0.48 3.55 3.31 
 
 Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for authorship variables for passed pretrial 
state legislation between 2012 and 2017. 83% of passed legislation was authored by 
either a single Republican or a single Democratic author, with almost half (48%) being 
written by a Republican author. The median values for both co-author count variables are 
0, which reflects the fact that most legislation that was passed had only a single author. 
That said, Democrats were both more likely to co-author a bill (134 out of 676 cases, or 
16.8% of cases had at least one Democratic co-author), and co-authored in larger 

















N 641 641 641 641 
0 Values 341 396 517 479 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 1 52 30 
Sum 300 245 650 858 
Median 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.47 0.38 1.01 1.34 
Var 0.25 0.24 18.58 11.26 
Std.Dev 0.5 0.49 4.31 3.36 
 
 Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for introduced pretrial state legislation in 
2018. The partisan leanings on authorship are roughly the same as the 2012-2017 data; 
however, co-authorship was both a more common occurrence, for both parties, as well as 
occurring in higher counts. 
 
Models and Results 
 The empirical analysis proceeds in three sections: 1) an analysis of the bipartisan 
outcome across the 2012-2017 and 2018 data, 2) an analysis of the total number of 
authors outcome across the 2012-2017 and 2018 data, and 3) an analysis of enactment 
outcomes across the 2018 data. The 2018 data will be used to explicitly test the direct 
impact of the algorithm variable on the outcome variables of interest: bipartisan 




explicitly test the direct impact of the algorithm variable on the bipartisan and total author 
count, as well as an interaction term between the year variable and the algorithm variable 
to test whether the impact of inclusion of algorithmic policy tools within criminal justice 
legislation has decreased over time. This is done in two separate models: the first, which 
does not include an interaction between inclusion of an algorithmic component and year, 
tests for a baseline impact of inclusion of an algorithmic component on the relevant 
dependent variable while the second, which includes an interaction between inclusion of 
an algorithmic component and year, tests for a dynamic effect of inclusion of an 
algorithmic component. 
 
Models 1 and 2: Probability of Bipartisanship 
 Models 1a, 1b, and 2 explicitly test for the relationship between inclusion of an 
algorithmic component, operationalized as a risk assessment tool, and the probability of a 
bill garnering bipartisan support at the authorship stage. Given the nature of the 
dependent variable as a binary operationalization of whether or not a bill has at least one 
co-author of the opposite party of the author (or at least one co-author of each party in the 
case of an independent author), both models rely on logistic regression to obtain 
parameter estimates. Model 1a and 1b test for a relationship with the 2012-2017 passed 
legislation while Model 2 tests for a relationship within the 2018 introduced legislation. 
Inclusion of the 2012-2017 data allows for the additional ability to test if the impact of 




additional independent variable constructed by interacting Algorithm with a year variable 
in Model 1b42.  
The discussion from Chapter 2 on the general nature of algorithmic impacts 
focused in part on how the uncertainty surrounding specific policy outcomes allows 
ideologically motivated policy makers to assume their preferred policy outcomes will be 
met by adopting such ‘objectivity-framed’ tools. The immediate result of this is an 
environment more conducive to building bipartisan coalitions, as differing ideologically 
motivated actors assume that the ‘objective’ truth will yield a policy outcome closer to 
their ideal point. However, risk assessment algorithms, as a specific type of algorithmic 
tool, have had increased scrutiny applied to them over recent years. The combined effect 
of these two competing influences indicate that including risk assessment algorithms in 
criminal justice legislation should produce a baseline positive effect that has decreased 
over time. From this I derive the following two hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between risk assessment algorithms and criminal justice legislation: 
H1a: Risk assessment inclusion and bipartisan support at bill introduction 
have a positive association after controlling for authorship and state political 
control influences 
 
H1b: Interacting risk assessment inclusion and year will produce a negative 






                                                





Table 7: Model 1 and Model 2 Results 
 Bipartisan	
	 1a	 1b	 2	
Algorithmic	 0.92	 0.833	 0.166	
	 (0.589)	 (1.288)	 (0.434)	
Republican	Author	 0.119	 0.126	 0.504	
	
(0.263)	 (0.263)	 (0.249)	
Republican	Control	 -0.559	 -0.556	 -0.046	
	 (0.263)	 (0.263)	 (0.261)	
Democratic	Control	 -0.763	 -0.758	 -1.202	
	
(0.411)	 (0.411)	 (0.451)	
Party	Type	 -0.055	 -0.048	 -0.341	
	 (0.208)	 (0.209)	 (0.158)	




Algorithmic	x	Year	 	 -0.228	 	
 
 (0.309)	 	
Constant	 -3.439	 -3.522	 -1.871	
	 (0.44)	 (0.461)	 (0.242)	
Observations	 676	 676	 641	
Log	Likelihood	 -245.786	 -245.537	 -232.662	
Akaike	Inf.	Crit.	 505.571	 507.074	 477.323	
 
 Table 7 reports the results from Models 1a, 1b, and 2; the primary observation 
here is that models 1a and 2 both provide support for Hypothesis 1a: inclusion of an 
algorithmic component is associated with an increased likelihood of bipartisan authorship 
support in both sets of data. The fact that the data are population level from which no 
inferences to other populations are being made, means that the standard errors are not of 
analytical importance for this analysis. Instead, the discussion will be limited to the 
direction and size of the estimated effects, which, as discussed, are the ‘true’ population 




For the 2012-2017 data, inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm increased the 
odds of bipartisan support by 151% (exp(0.92) -1) on average over the time period, while 
the corresponding increase for the 2018 data was 18%. Model 1b provides support for 
Hypothesis 1b: the relationship between algorithmic inclusion and bipartisan authorship 
support has decreased with time. Inclusion of a risk assessment tool in a piece of 
legislation that was eventually passed was associated with an 130% increase in the odds 
of having bipartisan authorship support, but this was only in 2012. In the following year, 
2013, inclusion of a risk assessment tool was associated with only an 83% increase in the 
odds of having bipartisan authorship support. The impact of risk assessment inclusion 
would actually switch direction in 2016, where it was associated with an 8% decrease in 
the odds of having bipartisan authorship support. This relationship obtains its minimal 
value in 2017, where inclusion of a risk assessment tool was associated with a 26% 
decrease in the odds of having bipartisan authorship support. The effect size on the 
algorithmic variable for Model 1b represents the exponentiated value of the coefficient 
estimated for the algorithm parameter only because in 2012 the year variable takes on a 
value of 0, so the interaction term between algorithm and year drop out, resulting in the 
130% increase in the odds of bipartisan support in 2012 alone. The year variable, when 
analyzed in isolation, indicates how the odds of bipartisan support changed with each 
additional year since 2012 when the algorithmic variable is equal to 0, i.e., in bills that 
did not contain an algorithmic policy tool. The hypothesis is unconcerned with the 
general trends in bipartisanship for non-algorithmic criminal justice legislation, so the 




 The impact of the various control variables was consistent across both models. 
Both forms of unified control were associated with a decrease in the likelihood of 
bipartisan support, more so for Democrats than Republicans, relative to a context 
characterized by divided government. Bills with primary Republican authors were also 
more likely to attract bipartisan authorship support relative to bills with primary 
Democratic authors. Bills authored by majority party members under unified government 
were less likely to attract bipartisan support. For the 2012-2017 data, bipartisan 
authorship was positively associated with higher years, indicating that bipartisanship 
increased over time for non-algorithmic pretrial legislation that eventually passed through 
the legislature. 
 
Models 1 and 2: Results Discussion 
The results of Model 1a, Model 1b, and Model 2 suggests there may be aspects of 
algorithmic decision aids that enable bipartisan coalitions to emerge. However, they also 
illustrate that, as hypothesized, in this case, coalitional support declined substantially 
since the analysis began in 2012. This year showed an increase in bipartisan authorship of 
85% relative to other pretrial legislation, but by 2017, inclusion of a risk assessment in 
legislation was associated with a 26% decrease in the likelihood of bipartisan authorship. 
Specifically, the direction of the relationship between risk assessment inclusion and 
bipartisan support changes in 2016, at the same time criticism of the tools became public 




narrative about algorithmic systems in the criminal justice context may depress 
legislative support, even given the previous structural incentives.  
Model 2 results in an increase in bipartisan support in 2018; however, this change 
in direction, compared to the negative overall relation of risk assessment algorithms in 
2017 for Model 1b, is likely due to the fact that this dataset contain all bills (enacted, 
failed, and pending), so it may be true that the inclusion of risk assessments still increase 
bipartisan support early in the process, but that many of these bills ultimately fail. While 
inclusion of an algorithmic component was positively associated with passed legislation 
for 2012-2015, and then negatively associated in 2016 and 2017, the positive association 
seen in the 2018 data for Model 2 is not directly comparable since this data includes 
passed as well as failed pieces of legislation. It may be the case that bipartisan coalitions 
were still aided by the inclusion of an algorithmic component, but that the broader 
temporal turn against risk assessments meant that many of these pieces of legislation 
ultimately failed to pass. Indeed, reanalyzing Model 2 on the subset of 2018 data that did 
pass shows a negative relationship between inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm and 
bipartisan support (with a coefficient estimate of -0.59), which continues the time trend 
observed in the 2012-2017 data. 
 
Models 3 and 4: Total Author Count  
 Models 3a, 3b, and 4 explicitly test for a relationship between inclusion of an 
algorithmic policy component in a piece of legislation, operationalized as inclusion of a 




legislation. Given the nature of the dependent variable as a count variable, Poisson 
models are used to estimate model coefficients. Model 3a tests for a relationship with the 
2012-2017 passed legislation, Model 3b tests for a dynamic relationship in the 2012-2017 
passed legislation, and Model 4 tests for a relationship only within the 2018 introduced 
legislation. The rationale and expectations are similar to the bipartisan models. The 
expectation is that there is a baseline positive effect on legislative coalition building, 
observed as number of co-authors, for including a risk assessment component, but that 
this effect has eroded over time due to increased scrutiny and public/media skepticism. 
Therefore, over time, we should observe the inclusion of an algorithmic component be 
more negatively associated with number of co-authors. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: Risk assessment inclusion and total author count at bill introduction have a 
positive association after controlling for author partisanship and state political 
control influences 
 
H2b: Interacting risk assessment inclusion and year will produce a negative 
parameter estimate for the impact on total author count after controlling for author 








Table 8: Model 3 and Model 4 Results 
 Total	Authors	
	 3a	 3b	 4	
Algorithmic	 -0.399	 -0.311	 0.087	
	 (1.04)	 (0.272)	 (0.073)	
Republican	Author	 -0.181	 -0.18	 0.044	
	 (0.051)	 (0.052)	 (0.047)	
Republican	Control	 -0.111	 -0.111	 0.101	
	 (0.052)	 (0.052)	 (0.051)	
Democratic	Control	 -0.383	 -0.383	 -0.015	
	
(0.079)	 (0.079)	 (0.062)	
Party	Type	 -0.082	 -0.081	 0.125	
	 (0.038)	 (0.038)	 (0.03)	
Year	 0.237	 0.238	 	
 (0.015)	 (0.016)	 	
Algorithmic	x	Year	 	 -0.023	 	
 
 (0.067)	 	
Constant	 0.529	 0.524	 1.071	
	 (0.074)	 (0.076)	 (0.046)	
Observations	 676	 676	 641	
Log	Likelihood	 -2,240.72	 -2,240.66	 -2,534.20	
Akaike	Inf.	Crit.	 4,495.45	 4,497.33	 5,080.39	
 
 Table 8 provides the results for the poisson regressions estimated by models 3a, 
3b, and 4. The estimates are reported as coefficient estimates as opposed to incident rate 
ratios, which aid in the determination of the direction of an effect at the expense of 
interpretability of effect size. The direction of the effect is the main factor in determining 
support for a hypothesis for this framework, but making substantive interpretations of the 
logged rate ratios is difficult. The coefficient estimates (logged rate ratios) can be 
exponentiated, like log odds in the logit framework, to obtain incident rate ratios that 




the count being modeled as the dependent variable. Thus, the estimated coefficient of 
0.087 on algorithmic in Model 4 indicates a positive relationship between inclusion of an 
algorithmic component, operationalized as a risk assessment tool, and the total number of 
authors associated with a pretrial bill being introduced in 2018. Exponentiating the 
coefficient yields a value of 1.09, which indicates that a one-unit increase in the 
algorithmic variable, or the impact of moving from a bill with no algorithmic component 
to a bill with an algorithmic component, is associated with a 9% increase in the total 
number of authors43 associated with a bill. This provides some support for Hypothesis 2a, 
but the findings from Model 3a provide conflicting evidence. For the 2012-2017 passed 
legislation, including a risk assessment tool was associated with a 33% decrease (1-exp(-
0.399) on average over the time period. 
Model 3b provides support for Hypothesis 2b: inclusion of an algorithmic component is 
associated with a 27% decrease in the total number of authors on that bill (1- exp(-0.311)) 
in 2012; this decreased over time to a 34% decrease in 2017. Thus, while the overall 
support for Hypothesis 2a is mixed, Hypothesis 2b does find support with Model 3b; the 
interaction between algorithm and year is associated with a 1.6% additive decrease per 
year on the total impact of including an algorithm on total number of authors.       
Interestingly, models 3a and 4 also provide conflicting evidence for the impact of 
the control variables on the total number of authors. The association between unified 
                                                
43 In a more technical sense, inclusion of an algorithmic component is associated with a 9% increase in the 
incident rate ratio, which is the number of relevant analysis units observed over the time period each unit is 
observed. For the purposes of this analysis, this is the number of co-authors observed over a legislative 





Democratic control and total number of authors is negative in both the 2012-2017 passed 
legislation and the 2018 introduced legislation, but the other common controls switch 
direction in their association on the DV. Being authored by a Republican relative to a 
Democrat has a negative association with total number of authors in the 2012-2017 data 
but a positive one in 2018, and the same is true for a bill authored in the context of 
unified Republican control. Likewise, being authored by a member of the majority party 
was associated with a decrease in the total number of authors, relative to being authored 
under the context of divided government, in the 2012-2017 data, but was associated with 
an increase in the total number of authors in the 2018 data (the inverse would be true for 
bills authored by minority party members relative to bills authored under the context of 
divided government). These findings may be indicative of the fact that the data 
generation process for the total number of authors associated with a bill are 
fundamentally different for passed legislation between 2012 and 2017 and introduced 
legislation in 2018 in ways that are not true for bipartisan support at the authorship stage. 
 
Models 3 and 4: Results Discussion 
 The conflicting results between models 3a and 4 for the impact of risk assessment 
algorithms provide mixed evidence for algorithmic impacts in legislative policymaking. 
However, the mirrored results on the control variables between models 3a and 4 indicate 
the inconclusive evidence for risk assessments is less due to issues with the fundamental 
theory of algorithmic impacts and more to due to fundamental differences in the data 




2018 dataset. The 2018 dataset represents both passed and unpassed legislation while the 
2012-2017 data is comprised only of passed legislation. The 2012-2017 data are 
characterized by both a lower mean value for total author count and a higher mean value 
for party type, indicating that the passed legislation for 2012-2017 and the introduced 
legislation in 2018 differ in that the passed legislation attracted fewer authors and were 
more likely to be authored by the members of the majority party in the context of unified 
control. In this situation, the bipartisan coalition building capacity of algorithmic tools 
could be a liability. Majority party leaders may be less willing to advance bipartisan bills, 
and majority party members may be less willing to join onto bipartisan legislation. 
Successful legislation passed by bipartisan coalitions could attract fewer members of the 
majority party than non-bipartisan coalitions; algorithmic components, by attracting 
bipartisan support, could decrease the total number of authors by alienating majority 
party members. Regardless of how the data differ, the almost complete reversal of the 
signs on the parameters between the two models is less an indication of the mixed results 
of algorithmic impacts and more about how number of co-authors differs between passed 
legislation and introduced legislation. These differences are interesting in and of 
themselves, but beyond the scope of this analysis.  
 
Model 5: 2018 Legislation Probability of Enactment  
 Model 5 explicitly tests for the relationship between inclusion of an algorithmic 
component on likelihood of bill enactment by analyzing the relationship between 




legislatures in 2018. The initial theory discussion would indicate an indirect positive 
impact of inclusion of a risk assessment algorithm on pretrial legislation enactment, 
channeled through the positive benefits of building larger coalitions. However, given the 
significant backlash that risk assessments have received in recent years, coupled with the 
fact that the data is only for 2018, yields the opposite prediction: that inclusion of a risk 
assessment algorithm decreases the probability of a pretrial legislation being enacted. The 
impact of the proposed backlash effect is given increased prominence, effect 
expectations, and significance specifically due to the fact that the dependent variable is 
bill passage through the legislature and eventual enactment by the state executive, a 
particularly strident test of political support. Between the year effects and the particularly 
high bar for the dependent variable, the baseline positive indirect effects of algorithms on 
legislative passage discussed in Chapter 2 are not expected to outweigh the effects of 
popular skepticism and backlash against risk assessments observed in recent years.44 
                                                
44 There is still, technically, room for a null finding where the baseline effects of algorithmic inclusion 
washout the backlash effects generated in recent years. There are a number of reasons, specifically in this 
framework, to suspect this is not the case. The most immediate reason is due to the nature of not engaging 
in significance testing due to the population level data. A null finding would have to rely on either the 
effects exactly equaling each other or drawing some arbitrary interval around zero where the combined 
effects would be considered indistinguishable from zero. In the first case this is just unlikely, and in the 
second, there is not a pressing reason to draw, and by extension defend, such a threshold when the actual 
estimates can just be reported and discussed. There are additional, substantive reasons to not suspect a null 
finding. The discussion in Chapter 2 does not describe a direct link between inclusion of an algorithmic 
component and bill passage/enactment, rather algorithmic inclusion indirectly impacts bill passage by 
increasing a legislative coalitions size/diversity and by theoretically increasing the winset under which 
competing veto players would agree to adopt a new policy over the status quo. This indirect link is already 
weaker than the direct links expected under bipartisan support and number of co-authors. Additionally, 
passage and enactment of a bill is overall difficult; only 23% of all introduced legislation was enacted for 
2018. Lastly, as the most recent year in the data collected, 2018 is likely to have the strongest effects for the 
hypothesized backlash, making an already difficult task (enactment) even less likely to occur. Between all 
these factors, the baseline positive, indirect effect of algorithmic inclusion on legislative passage are very 





Given the nature of enactment data, this relationship is tested via a logistic regression 
model with the following hypothesis: 
H3: Risk assessment inclusion and pretrial bill enactment have a negative 
association after controlling for authorship and state political control influences for 
the most recent year in the analysis, which follows the peak of negative coverage. 
 
Table 9: Model 5 Results 
  Enactment 
  5 
Algorithmic 0.527 
  (0.39) 
Republican Author 0.292 
  (0.226) 
Republican Control 0.478 
  (0.229) 
Democratic Control 1.758 
  (0.396) 
Party Type 0.631 
  (0.175) 
Bipartisan 0.663 
  (0.271) 
Constant 1.369 
  (0.214) 
Observations 641 
Log Likelihood 314.358 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 642.716 
  
 
 Table 9 reports the results from the logistic regression of Model 5.The table 
reports coefficient estimates as log odds to ease in detection of directional impacts. Of 
immediate note is that the findings on the algorithmic variable are in the negative 




decrease in the likelihood of enactment of pretrial legislation by 41% (exp(-0.527)=.59). 
However, under unified control, Democratic or Republican, the odds of enactment of any 
pretrial legislation decreases by 83% and 38%, respectively, relative to being introduced 
in a legislative session characterized by divided control. Meanwhile, authorship by a 
Republican relative to a Democrat increased the odds of enactment by 34%, bipartisan 
inclusion of co-authors increased the odds of enactment by 94%, and authorship by a 
member of the majority party increased the odds of enactment by 88% relative to a 
member of a party under divided government and 253% relative to authorship by a 
member of the minority party.  
 
Model 5: Results Discussion 
Model 5 shows that there is support for the hypothesis that by 2018, inclusion of 
an algorithmic component, in the form of a risk assessment algorithm, decreases the 
likelihood of enactment of a piece of pretrial legislation; in fact, it is likely to decrease 
the odds of enactment by about 2/5ths. This is in line with the observation within the 
literature, as reviewed previously, that there was a turn against risk assessment algorithms 
in the mid/latter part of this decade. It may also be the case that the hypothesized 
mechanism for which algorithmic policy inclusion impacts enactment, bipartisan 
coalition building, is a less useful attribute in state legislatures dominated by unified 
single party control. Enactment of a policy in any given year may have more to do with 
the demands and goals of party leadership (in the context of single party control of the 




preferences of coalitions are more likely to survive changes in party control and 
leadership. Analyzing enactment in a single year as a metric for success is unable to 
capture much of the nuances of the legislative process: proposed legislation can exist in 
many forms over several legislative sessions. Those bills with bipartisan support may 
have an advantage in situations of change in party control or movement from unified to 
divided control. They may even be more robust once enacted, being able to survive 
changes in party control without significant alteration by a newly elected majority. 
As risk assessment algorithms, and algorithms more generally continue to be 
introduced, marked up, tested against committee votes, amended, tested against floor 
votes, and sent to governors, better and more plentiful time series data will continue to be 
generated. As this type of data becomes available, the possibility of testing the 
relationships between algorithms, bipartisan support, legislative session survival and 
reintroduction, and eventual enactment becomes more of a reality. 
 
Conclusion 
 The above analyses indicate that in the early 2010s, there were distinct advantages 
to including algorithmic components to criminal justice reform legislation, including 
bipartisan support and attracting greater numbers of authors early in the drafting stage. 
These advantages may have also given bills containing an algorithmic risk assessment a 
greater probability of passage compared to other criminal justice reform bills. However, 
due to the limitations of the NCSL data, this analysis cannot assess implications on bill 




indicated that an algorithmic component in legislation decreases the likelihood of 
passaged compared to non-algorithmic bills. This is not surprising given the progressive, 
yearly decline in other kinds of support found in 2012-2017. 
 One of the main takeaways here is that while there are reasons to suspect, pending 
more thorough empirical work, that ADSs potentially have systemic advantages, 
specifically in the form of increased bipartisan support, the potential backlash effects of 
sustained public scrutiny appear to be enough erode such advantages. This indicates that 
the potential future of ADSs will be highly dependent on how the public engages with 
and responds to such systems. To the extent that negative public scrutiny maintains over 
time, the adoption and spread of ADS systems may be curtailed; however, if these 
systems improve over time, begin to ameliorate particular harms associated with them, or 
if public scrutiny recedes, the potential structural advantages of these systems may result 
in an increase in adoption rates across policy areas. 
 Fundamentally, this chapter has provided a framework for integrating empirical 
analyses into broader work on understanding the impact of algorithms on society, while 
also advancing an argument that algorithmic decision systems are political artifacts that 
have distinctive political process implications. The experience of pretrial risk assessments 
provide initial support for the idea that algorithmic policies not only impact but are 
impacted by distinctly political pressures and need to be studied as explicitly political 
objects. However, making further claims about the strength of specific causal claims or 







Future research would benefit from panel data that could analyze all introduced 
legislation across several legislative sessions to determine whether or not algorithmic 
policy interventions aided in garnering and maintaining bipartisan support, and whether, 
in turn, that support aided in a bill surviving through successive legislative sessions until 
eventual enactment, as opposed to examining enactment at a single point in time. Such 
data would also allow for post-enactment evaluations of legislative robustness; even after 
a bill is successfully passed and enacted, it is subject to new legislation curtailing, 
expanding, or changing its scope. Bipartisan support for enacted legislation may insulate 
it from changes in partisan composition, priorities, and control in ways more polarized 
legislation is not. This is just one of many potential avenues of research to pursue; the 
concluding chapter will, in part, focus on discussing and developing additional 
methodological pursuits to test and leverage the explanatory power of algorithmic 






Conclusions and Future Research 
 
 Algorithmic decision systems have seen a remarkable trajectory in terms of 
engagement from legislators, bureaucrats, and the public. While the antecedents of these 
systems have existed for several decades, ADSs in their current form, characterized by 
machine learning techniques and access to large swaths of training data, have only 
existed as a legitimate policy tool since about the beginning of the 21st century. Yet 
despite that short time frame, they have garnered incredible amounts of attention, 
including from scholars, politicians, government administrators, journalists, and the 
public. However, the attention has come with rapid adoption in various policy areas, as 
well as rapid skepticism and backlash against their use in those same policy areas. For 
scholars engaged in areas ranging from governance to technology to ethics, ADSs 
represent a rich subject area for gaining new insight and traction on issues and questions 
endemic to these fields. Scholars in a variety of cross-sectional socio technical disciplines 
(including political science), are tasked with understanding how computational 
algorithms can identify and correct issues related to inequality, inaccuracy, or a lack of 
transparency, despite the fact that the underlying technology is often incredibly difficult 
to understand or examine due to its proprietary structure and/or blackbox methodological 
approach. Social scientists have the opportunity to examine how issues of advanced 
algorithmic systems might impact core socio-political issues like representation, efficacy, 




 Algorithmic policies and decision systems represent such an important research 
area because they promise so much: ADSs have the potential to drastically increase the 
capacity of governments to provide services and lower the costs of inefficiencies in 
governance, or they may potentially entrench historic injustices in ways that make 
fighting and reversing them once entrenched all the more fraught and difficult. These 
impacts, and almost every permutation in between, are often the urgent subject of popular 
and scholarly discourses around the topic of algorithms and society. Whether or not 
ADSs can deliver on their proponents’ loftiest promises, or their detractors’ worst fears, 
remains to be seen, but what is apparent is that governments, local, regional, and national, 
seem inclined to pass and implement. The rapid change that the implementation of these 
tools creates is an incredibly important research opportunity, both for bringing new 
perspectives on old subjects, and for providing the necessary insight and evidence to 
guide development, design, implementation, and review of these tools. My dissertation 
has aimed to contribute three meaningful arguments to the scholarly discussion on ADSs.  
First, I have sought to elucidate specific ways that ADSs, long considered 
‘objective’ policy tools that simply provide uncontestable truths, are distinctly political 
artifacts. Specifically, I have emphasized that they (A) are tools for advancing 
specifically political goals, such as enabling legislators to move policy outcomes closer to 
their preferences (B) have distinctly political impacts on policy outcomes and processes, 
and (C) are a locus for political activity, such as increased critical scrutiny and backlash 




 Second, I have sought to provide a roadmap for how research into algorithms and 
society can be paired with empirical work to strengthen arguments and claims. My 
dissertation does this by providing a macro-level analysis of state legislative activity, 
which can be used to better analyze systemic questions and build a more robust evidence 
for evaluating claims and understanding impacts.  
 Lastly, I have sought to bring focus on how ADSs can have distinctive impacts on 
political processes, that can in turn result in systemic advantages for these policy tools 
relative to other policy tools. While the evidence gathered here is not sufficient to make 
strong causal statements, it is enough to demonstrate a case for the existence of such 
impacts and advantages and to justify a call for more research and scholarly attention in 
this direction. Attendant on to this point has been a common theme throughout my 
dissertation: the tension between potential systemic advantages of ADSs and the 
moderating effect of public scrutiny and backlash. The evidence presented in Chapter 4 
indicates that the effect of the backlash serves to potentially overwhelm any systemic 
advantages of ADSs for the most recent years of the data. However, whether or not this 
attention can be sustained, or whether designers of these systems can make changes that 
meaningfully address concerns remains to be seen. What remains is the necessity for 
scholars to pay attention and document this tension in order to better understand if and 
how ADSs may continue to propagate through policy areas and levels of government. 
Beyond the need to merely pay attention to the tension between systemic advantages and 






 How targeted populations are affected, or how accurately algorithms perform, are 
questions whose answers will vary across contexts, particularly, as new norms and 
institutions arise from the interplay of algorithmic policies. But to understand how 
algorithms will fundamentally interact, shape, and conflict with existing institutions, 
rules, practices, and distributions of resources and power, scholars must understand how 
these tools impact processes as well as outcomes. For instance, we must begin to answer 
the following questions: 
● How will algorithmic policies change the behavior of lawmakers, bureaucrats, and 
lobbyists?  
● How will algorithmic policies interact with non-algorithmic policies?  
● What issue areas are likely to see more algorithmic policy making activity/less 
activity?  
● How will algorithmic policies change notions of efficacy and representativeness 
among the broader public?  
These questions are ones of process that specifically focus on populations that are 
not the intended target populations of such policies. Answering these questions will give 
broader insight into how society and politics might change if more of these policies are 
proposed and enacted. The goal being to answer a central question: how does a society 





This includes the vitally important questions of outcomes: which groups benefit, 
which are harmed, and how does the distribution of power and resources change? But it 
also includes equally vital questions of process: how are politics practiced differently, 
how are resources distributed, how representative and responsive are institutions? 
The empirical analysis in the prior chapter provides a roadmap that can be 
improved upon. One way is through the further collection and analysis on panel data 
regarding legislation. Bills can linger through multiple sessions of a legislature before 
being passed or failing to be reintroduced in following session. However, legislation can 
also garner small and large changes that fundamentally alter the structure and nature of 
the bill. Pairing panel data on bill introductions and eventual enactments with natural 
language processing (NLP) techniques can help to identify core policy concepts that 
make up pieces of legislation and change over time (in this way, we can conceptualize a 
bill at any given time as a coalition of policy concepts, where the right combination of 
concepts and context results in the ultimate passage of a piece of legislation). Identifying 
such core concepts and analyzing how they manifest across legislative sessions can 
potentially provide significant insight into how certain ideas, tactics, or contexts impact 
the policy making process. Such a methodological process can also give insight into how 
pieces of legislation are changed and challenged even after enactment, or why some ideas 
continue to be reintroduced after failing to pass while others are not. One of the core 
policy concepts of interest for this research program would be algorithmic policy, in 




reintroduced and eventually passed, and by extension what other policy elements are 
likely to be paired with algorithms and aided by the passage of the combined legislation. 
Lastly, future work would benefit from expanding the scope of the political 
context that algorithmic policies are introduced within. The analysis here focused purely 
on partisan control; however, there are many more actors in a legislature than just parties. 
Information on lobbying efforts, media attention, and public opinion are all relevant 
pieces of information that could impact the success and effects of algorithmic policies. 
Indeed, much of the discussion in Chapter 4 focused on the potential backlash against 
risk assessment algorithms; a backlash made possible by sustained public and media 
attention. If algorithmic policies offer structural advantages to pieces of legislation (such 
as larger and more diverse coalitions in support), then these advantages are only checked 
as long the media and concerned publics sustain focus on the issue. However, as public 
awareness or sentiments change, or as media or lobbying groups shift efforts and 
attention to other policies/issues, potential systemic advantages can reassert themselves. 
Expanding the empirical analysis done here to capture variation in other aspects of 
political context can help elucidate the impact of mitigating factors and how those factors 
might ebb and flow relative to more robust structural advantages. I hope my dissertation 
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Appendix A: Dataset Generation Code 
#State Pre-Trial Policy Database Constructor 
 
#This script loads the State Pre-Trial Policy website database housed at the  
#National Conference of State Legislature website. A version of the database  
#site is loaded using a previously constructed raw text file that contains the  
#text from a full search of the pretrial database. This data is formatted, cleaned, 







import pandas as pd 
from math import sqrt 
 
#Global Definitions 






    with open(filename, 'r') as file: 
        data = file.read() 
         
    return [info.split('\n') for info in data.split('\n\n')] 
 
def loadStateInfo(): 
    with open('State Party Data.xlsx', 'rb') as file: 
        d = {} 
        for year in [str(year) for year in range(2012,2019)]: 
            reader = pd.read_excel(file, sheet_name = year, index_col=1) 
            d[year] = reader.to_dict('index') 
    return d 
 
def classifyItem(data): 
    if 'Additional Authors' in data: 
        data = data.split(':') 
        info = data[1].split(' ') 




        return(data[0], info_auth, ' '.join(info[-2:]), data[-1]) 
    elif ':' in data: 
        return data.split(':') 
    else: 
        return '.' 
 
def classify(data): 
    info = {'id' : data[0], 
            'year' : data[1], 
            'name' : data[2]} 
     
    data = data[3:] 
    for item in data: 
        item = classifyItem(item) 
        if item == '.': 
            continue 
        if len(item) == 4: 
            info[item[0]] = item[1] 
            info[item[2]] = item[3] 
        else: 
            info[item[0]] = item[1] 
     
    return (info['id'], info) 
 
def writeLeg(filename, data): 
    with open(filename, 'a') as file: 
        writer = csv.writer(file, lineterminator = '\n') 
        info = [data.get(var, '-') for var in header] 
        writer.writerow(info) 
         
def getTopics(): 
    d ={} 
    for topic in topics: 
        d[topic] = lambda x, topic = topic: 1 if topic in x else 0 
    return d 
 
def statusCheck(status): 
    status = status.split('-') 
    status = [item.lstrip(' ').strip(' ') for item in status] 
    return '-'.join(status[1:]) if status[0] == 'Enacted' else status[1] 
 
def partyType(data): 




    elif data['Republican Control'] == data['Democratic Control']: return 0 
    elif data['Democratic Author'] == data['Democratic Control']: return 1 
    else: return -1 
 
#Database Construction 
data_pending = loadFile('leg_results_pending.txt') 
data_pending = [item[1:] if 'BILL TEXT LOOKUP' in item [0] else item  
                for item in data_pending] 
 
data_pending = [classify(item) for item in data_pending] 
data_pending = {item[0]:item[1] if item is not None else item for item in data_pending} 
 
data_enacted = loadFile('leg_results_enacted.txt') 
data_enacted = [item[1:] if 'BILL TEXT LOOKUP' in item [0] else item  
                for item in data_enacted] 
 
data_enacted = [classify(item) for item in data_enacted] 
data_enacted = {item[0]:item[1] for item in data_enacted} 
 
with open('pending_leg.csv', 'w') as file: 
    writer = csv.writer(file, lineterminator = '\n') 
    writer.writerow(header) 
     
with open('enacted_leg.csv', 'w') as file: 
    writer = csv.writer(file, lineterminator = '\n') 
    writer.writerow(header) 
     
for leg in data_pending.keys(): 
    writeLeg('pending_leg.csv', data_pending[leg]) 
     
for leg in data_enacted.keys(): 
    writeLeg('enacted_leg.csv', data_enacted[leg]) 
     
#Read Data into Pandas Frame 
data_pending = pd.read_csv('pending_leg.csv', encoding='unicode_escape') 
 
data_enacted = pd.read_csv('enacted_leg.csv', encoding='unicode_escape') 
     
#Tabulate Topics and Status Types 
topics = [] 
i = 0 
for item in set(data_pending['Topics']): 




        for topic in item.split(','): 
            topic = topic.lstrip(' ').strip(' ') 
            if topic not in topics: 
                topics.append(topic) 
 
while i < max([string.count('and') for string in set(data_pending['Topics'])]) +1: 
    for item in set(data_pending['Topics']): 
        if 'and' in item: 
            for topic in topics: 
                item = item.replace(topic, '') 
            if item.count('and') == 1: 
                while item[0] in [' ', ','] or item[-1] in [' ', ',']:  
                    item = item.lstrip(' ').strip(' ').lstrip(',').strip(',') 
                if item not in topics: 
                    topics.append(item) 
    i += 1 
 
#Break Out Topics 
topicFuncs = getTopics() 
for topic in topics: 
    data_pending[topic] = data_pending['Topics'].apply(topicFuncs[topic]) 
    data_enacted[topic] = data_enacted['Topics'].apply(topicFuncs[topic]) 
 
with open('keyword_file.txt', 'r') as file: 
    keyword_list = file.read().split('\n') 
 
summaries_dict = {} 
state_info = loadStateInfo() 
 
for data in [data_pending, data_enacted]: 
    data['State'] = data['id'].apply(lambda x:x.strip(' ').lstrip(' ').split(' ')[0]) 
#Create sub-status category 
    data['Final Status'] = data['Status'].apply(lambda x: x.split('-')[0].lstrip(' ').strip(' ')) 
    data['Substatus'] = data['Status'].apply(statusCheck) 
#Create additional Author Variables 
    data['Additional Authors List'] = data['Additional Authors'].apply(lambda x: x.split(';')) 
    data['Republican Author'] = data['Author'].apply(lambda x: 1 if  "(R)" in x else 0) 
    data['Democratic Author'] = data['Author'].apply(lambda x: 1 if "(D)" in x else 0) 
    data['R Co-Author Count'] = data['Additional Authors'].apply(lambda x: 
x.count("(R)")) 





    data['Total Authors'] = data['Additional Authors List'].apply(lambda x: len(x) + 1 if 
x[0] != '-' else 1) 
    data['Algorithmic'] = data['Risk Assessments'] 
#Create State Control Variables 
    data['State Control'] = data.apply(lambda x: state_info[str(x['year'])][x['State']]['State 
Control'], axis = 1) 
    data['Republican Control'] = data['State Control'].apply(lambda x: 1 if x == 'R' else 0) 
    data['Democratic Control'] = data['State Control'].apply(lambda x: 1 if x == 'D' else 0) 
    data['Unified Control'] = data['State Control'].apply(lambda x: 1 if x=='R' or x=='D' 
else 0) 
    data['Party'] = data['Republican Author'] + -1*data['Democratic Author'] 
    data['Party Type'] = data.apply(partyType, axis = 1) 
    data['Bipartisan'] = data.apply(lambda row: 1 if (row['Republican Author'] > 0 and 
row['D Co-Author Count'] > 0) or  
                                                    (row['Democratic Author'] > 0 and row['R Co-Author 
Count'] > 0) or 
                                                    (row['R Co-Author Count'] > 0 and row['D Co-Author 
Count'] > 0) else 0, axis = 1) 
    data['Bipartisan Factor'] = data.apply(lambda row: 2 * (-1/2 + (1/(1 + 
abs((row['Republican Author'] + row['R Co-Author Count'])/row['Total Authors'] - 
(row['Democratic Author'] + row['D Co-Author Count'])/row['Total Authors'])))), axis 
=1) 
    data['Weighted Bipartisan Factor'] = data['Total Authors'] * data['Bipartisan 
Factor'].apply(sqrt) 
    data['Bipartisan Factor'] = data.apply(lambda row: '' if row['Republican Author'] == 
row['Democratic Author'] else row['Bipartisan Factor'], axis = 1) 
    data['Weighted Bipartisan Factor'] = data.apply(lambda row: '' if row['Republican 
Author'] == row['Democratic Author'] else row['Weighted Bipartisan Factor'], axis = 1) 
#Algorithm Detection Loop 
    valid_topics = [] 
    for case in data.index: 
        if data.loc[case,'Risk Assessments'] == 1: 
            for topic in topics:  
                if data.loc[case,topic] == 1 and topic not in valid_topics: 
                    valid_topics.append(topic) 
 
    data['Valid'] = 1 
    for topic in topics: 
        data['Valid'] = data[topic].apply(lambda x, info = topic: 1 if info not in valid_topics 
or x == 0 else 0) * data['Valid'] 
    data['Valid'] = -1 * (data['Valid'] - 1) 
    for topic in [topic for topic in topics if topic not in valid_topics]: 





#Re-write Data to csv 
data_pending.to_csv('data_pending_analysis.csv', index = False) 
data_enacted.to_csv('data_enacted_analysis.csv', index = False) 
#End Script 
